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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
Section 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
The appeal is taken pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal is from an order granting the appellees' Motion
for Summary Judgment. Consequently, the appellate court must
review the facts most favorable to the appellant. No deference is
given to the trial court's conclusions of law and those conclusions
are reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State,
779 P.2d 634 (Utah, 1989).
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
It is the contention of the appellant that the following
issues are presented by the appeal:
1. The "claims made" provision of the insurance policy
issued by the appellees is contrary to state law and contrary to
the language of the insurance policy. The insurance policy states
that any terms of the contract which are in conflict with the
statutes of Utah are amended to conform to such statutes. The
policy was written in 1977 and the statutes then in existence
regulating the term in which to bring an action were Section 78-
12-23(2) which provided that an action on a contract could be
brought within six years, and Section 78-12-25(2) which provided
a general statute of limitations of four years. Consequently, the
"claims made" terms of the insurance policy did not relieve the
appellees from liability under their insurance policy.
2. The appellees were given adequate notice of the claim of
the appellant. The insurance policy contains a "no action" clause
which provides that no action may be brought against the insurance
company until the amount of the insured's obligation to pay has
been fully determined by judgment against the insured.
Consequently, the appellant was prevented by the terms of the
policy from instigating an action until after it had obtained a
judgment against Utah Title and Abstract Company. A judgment was
entered against Utah Title and Abstract Company in January of 1988.
The appellant discovered the existence of the insurance coverage
in approximately April or May of 1988 and notified the appellees
by a letter dated June 3, 1988.
3. The appellant is a beneficiary under the insurance policy
written by the appellees for Utah Title and Abstract Company.
Consequently, as an injured party, the appellant must be given the
opportunity to litigate the coverage under the liability insurance
policy before its interest in the insurance could be terminated.
A beneficiary has no way of knowing if an insurance policy is a
"claims made" policy or contains some limitation other than that
prescribed by state law; and, therefore, should not be bound by the
same. An insurance contract is a contract of adhesion; and,
consequently, courts have a special responsibility to prevent the
marketing of policies that provide unrealistic and inadequate
coverage to the public.
4. A "claims made" policy violates public policy which
requires that an adhesion contract be carefully examined to
determine whether or not it protects the public which may be
injured by the insured. The language of a "claims made" policy is
similar to a statute of repose and violates the provisions of
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND/OR STATUTES
1. Article I, Section 11, Utah Constitution.
2. Section 78-12-23(2) Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
3. Section 78-12-25(2) Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an Order on Judgment granting the
defendants/appellees Motion for Summary Judgment entered by Judge
Stanton M, Taylor on September 10, 1991, and filed with the clerk's
office on September 11, 1991. The appellant filed a Notice of
Appeal and Notice of Posting Bond with the clerk's office on the
10th day of October, 1991. No post judgment motions were filed by
either party.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During November and December of 1977, Utah Title and Abstract
Company prepared a Warranty Deed, Trust Deed, and a Trust Deed Note
and other related documents on behalf of the appellant and other
entities for the purpose of transferring and encumbering real
property. After the initial Deed and other documents were
prepared, an agent of Utah Title and Abstract Company, altered the
legal description attached to said documents adding a paragraph
thereto. The alteration resulted in conveying away from the
appellant the ownership of approximately three greens of a golf
course owned by the appellant. The alteration took place during
the latter part of 1977 or the early part of 1978. The appellant
did not learn of the alteration until approximately the summer of
1979. When the problem could not be resolved, a lawsuit was filed
in the Weber County District Court in November of 1979. After
extensive litigation and a bifurcated trial lasting for
approximately five weeks, a judgment was entered in favor of the
appellant against Utah Title and Abstract Company on the theory of
negligence in the sum of $400,000.00. (Judgment on Verdict issued
January 15, 1988).
In approximately May of 1988, the appellant became aware for
the first time that an errors and omissions policy of insurance had
been issued by the appellees in favor of Utah Title and Abstract
Company covering the period from. February 5, 1976 through February
5, 1977, and renewed for a period of February 5, 1977 through
February 5, 1978. Prior to May of 1988, Utah Title and Abstract
Company had denied that there was any errors and omissions
insurance policy in effect. On June 3, 1988, the appellees were
notified by letter of the claim of the appellant against Utah Title
and Abstract Company. The appellees claimed that they had not been
previously notified of the legal action brought against Utah Title
and Abstract Company. The appellees maintained that the policy
written by them was a "claims made" policy which stated: "This
policy applies to claims first made against the insured during the
policy period, arising from professional services performed. . .
The policy also contained a "no action" clause which required
that no action could be brought against the insurer until ". . .
the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been fully-
determined by judgment against the insured ...." The appellees
refused to honor the claim made by the appellant and a lawsuit was
filed in this action on August 8, 1989. (Answers to
Interrogatories enclosed herewith).
The trial court, Judge Stanton M. Taylor, did not want to
address the issue of a "claims made" policy being a violation of
public policy. In this regard the judge stated:
Well, interesting. I am not sure at this point Mr.
Echard to say that a "claims made" policies are a
violation of public policy and outlaw them in the State
of Utah. I -would prefer to leave that to the appellate
courts. . . .
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
It is the position of the appellant that the "claims made"
policy of insurance, by its terms, provides that an action may be
filed during the time provided by state law and if it did not so
provide would have been contrary to state law. Therefore, the
"claims made" provision of the policy can not be relied upon to
defeat the appellant's claim. The appellees' contention that it
is relieved from the liability because its insured, Utah Title and
Abstract Company, did not give reasonable notice is not valid
because the insured led Utah Title and Abstract Company to believe
that a claim could not be made on the policy after the one year
period for which it was written.. The appellant, as a beneficiary
under the insurance policy, could not file an action against the
insurance company because of the terms of the policy until after
it had secured a judgment. The appellant notified the appellees
of their claim on June 3, 1988, within five months of the date it
obtained a judgment, and instigated a lawsuit against the appellees
on the 8th day of August, 1989. As a beneficiary under the
insurance contract, the appellant must be given a reasonable
opportunity to litigate the insurance coverage. Even if the notice
of loss under the insurance policy was not given timely, the
appellant would not be prevented from making a claim under the
policy unless the appellees could show that they did not have
constructive knowledge of the claim and they were prejudice if they
did not receive notice.
An insurance policy is an adhesion contract and should be
examined carefully to determine whether or not it protects the
public which may be injured by the insured. A "claims made" policy
does not adequately protect the public and therefore violates
public policy. The language of a "claims made" policy is similar
to a statute of repose and, if enforced, would terminate the right
of an action by the insured or beneficiary from a date that is
unrelated to the injury. The denial of a recovery against the
insurance proceeds to a beneficiary would violate public policy and
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE "CLAIMS MADE" PROVISION OF THE INSURANCE POLICY
IS CONTRARY TO STATE LAW AND CONTRARY TO THE LANGUAGE OF
THE INSURANCE POLICY.
The appellees contend that the appellant's claim should be
barred because the insurance policy in question contains a "claims
made" provision. The language relied upon by the appellees is as
follows:
This policy applies to CLAIMS FIRST MADE AGAINST THE
INSURED DURING THE POLICY PERIOD, arising from
professional services performed: (a) during the policy
period, . . .
The insurance policy under "other conditions" also states:
3. Terms of contract conform to statute: The terms of
this contract that are in conflict with the statutes of
the state wherein this contract is issued are hereby
amended to conform to such statutes....
It is undisputed that the appellees issued the insurance
policies for periods of one year; with the first year period being
from February 5, 1976 through February 5, 1977 and the second
period being from February 5, 1977 through February 5, 1978. It
is the contention of the appellees that the insurance policy does
not cover any claim that was not made during the year for which
the policy was written.
In 1985 the Utah Legislature enacted Section 31A-21-313 and
other related sections providing that an action on a written policy
for contract of insurance must be commenced within three years and
that no insurance policy may limit the time for the beginning of
an action for less than a three year period. However, prior to
1985, the only statute existing in the State of Utah pertaining to
an action on a contract was Section 78-12-23(2) which required that
such an action be brought within six years. A claim for a negligent
act was controlled by Section 78-12-25(2) which required that an
action be brought within four years.
The language of the insurance policy under "other provisions",
notwithstanding the "claims made" provision, amends the insurance
policy to conform with state law. Consequently, a claim for
negligence or a claim on a written insurance policy could be
maintained within four year or six years. The lawsuit of the
appellant against Utah Title and Abstract Company was filed within
two years from the date of the insurance policy and the negligent
act. The appellees may not defeat the appellant's claim by
contending that the appellant had. to make a claim against the
insured, Utah Title and Abstract Company, during the one year term
of the insurance policy when the terms and conditions of that
policy were amended to comply with state law.
Insurance policies in the past have unsuccessfully attempted
to require that claims be filed within one year or they would be
barred. The attempt by the appellees and other insurance companies
to write a "claims made" policy and then issue the policy for one
year periods, is merely another attempt to accomplish what they
were unable to accomplish previously. The impact of that attempt
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is to still prohibit a claim under the insurance policy unless the
claim is made within a one year period of time. Such an act is
specifically in violation of Utah law and therefore is not
enforceable.
POINT II
THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM SHOULD NOT BE BARRED
BECAUSE OF UTAH TITLE AND ABSTRACT COMPANY'S FAILURE
TO GIVE NOTICE TO THE INSURER.
The appellees contend that even if the "claims made" provision
of the insurance policy cannot be enforced against the appellant,
the trial court was justified in granting a summary judgment
because Utah Title and Abstract Company did not provide a timely
notice to the appellees. The insurance policy, under "claims"
states:
1. Notice of Claim or Suit: The insured shall, as a
condition precedent to their right to the protection
afforded by this insurance, give the company as soon as
practical notice (a) of any claim made against them, .
However, the same policy provides under "endorsement":
This policy applies to CLAIMS FIRST MADE AGAINST THE
INSURED DURING THE POLICY PERIOD, arising from
professional serviced performed: . . .
The insurance policy specifically informed the insured, Utah
Title and Abstract Company, that no claims made after the policy
period which concluded on February 5, 1978, were covered by the
insurance policy. Consequently, Utah Title and Abstract Company
had no reason to give notice to the appellees of a claim that was
filed by the appellant in December of 1979, two years after the
negligent act and approximately 22 months after the termination of
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the insurance coverage. The failure of Utah Title and Abstract
Company to give notice to the appellees was a direct result of the
invalid and incorrect information placed in the insurance policy
by the appellees. If the "claims made" provision of the insurance
policy is unenforceable as contended by the appellant in Point I
of this memorandum, then the appellees cannot excuse themselves
from liability because of the lack of notice which was caused by
its own conduct.
If this court concludes that Utah Title and Abstract Company
had an obligation to give notice to the appellees in spite of the
"claims made" provisions of the policy, it is the position of the
appellant that the failure to give notice is not fatal to the
appellant's claim. A line of cases have recognized that where the
beneficiary of an insurance contract does not know of the existence
of the policy until the notice requirements therein have lapsed,
coverage should be invoked where the beneficiary thereafter gives
reasonable notice of his claim under the policy. See, e.g.: Munz
v. Standard Life & Accident Insurance Co., 72 P. 2d 182 (Utah 1903)
(Where the beneficiary of policy upon the life of the insured is
ignorant of the insured's death, delay in giving notice is
excused); Rowe v. National Security Fire & Casualty Co., 626 SW.2d
622 (Ark. App. 1982) (Failure to meet notice requirements of fire
policy was not effective against Plaintiff where she was unaware
of fire until notice time had run); Jackson Housing Authority v.
Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 686 SW.2d 917 (Tenn. App. 1984) (Notice
under a liability policy need not be given until after the insured
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has knowledge that an accident has occurred). See also: Standard
Accident Insurance Co. v. Alexander, Inc., 103 Fed.2d 500 (CA 5
Tex.. 1939); Reed v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Association, 76
NW. 2d 869 (Mich. 1956); Thompson v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society, 290 A.2d 422 (1972); Maize v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Co., 35 Pa D & C 2d 576 (1964).
The "no action" clause of the policy logically negates a
dismissal of this case. The insurance policy, under the "claims"
section states:
4. ACTION AGAINST THE COMPANY: No action shall lie
against the Company unless, as a condition precedent
thereto, the insured shall have fully complied with all
the terms of this policy, nor until the amount of the
insured's obligation to pay shall have been fully
determined by judgment against the insured after actual
trial or by written agreement of the insured, claimant
and the company. Any person or organization or the legal
representative thereof who has secured such judgment or
written agreement shall thereafter be entitled to recover
under this policy to the extent of the insurance afforded
by this policy. Nothing contained in this policy shall
give any person or organization any right to join the
Company as a co-defendant in any action against the
insured to determine the insured's liability. Bankruptcy
or insolvency of insured or of the insured's estate shall
not relieve the company of any its obligations hereunder.
The "no action" clause of the insurance policy contradicts any
notice of claim requirements. Specifically, Mutual Fire's insurance
policy requires that no action be brought against the insurer until
"the amount of the Insured's obligation to pay shall have been
fully determined by judgment against the Insured. In the instant
case, after judgment was secured against the Insured on January 15,
1988, the appellant did proceed against Utah Title's insurer,
appellees herein, and pursuant to the express language of the "no
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action" clause of the policy, the appellant has thus effectively
complied with its requirements.
The appellant should not be penalized for Utah Title's failure
to give notice as required under the insurance policy at issue.
In fact, Utah Title had specifically represented to the appellant
that it had no insurance coverage. It was not until after judgment
was rendered against it (and in favor of the appellant) in January,
1988, that the presence of insurance coverage by appellees herein
was disclosed. Thereafter, upon discovery of this insurance
coverage, Robert A. Echard, as attorney for the appellants,
immediately wrote to the appellees by a letter dated June 3, 1988,
notifying it of judgment rendered against Utah Title and the
appellant's claim against the appellees as the insurer thereof and
agent for Mutual Fire. These special factual circumstances also
warrant a reading of the contract to allow recovery for the
appellant against the appellees herein. To disregard such special
factual circumstances, would make the effect of "claims-made"
policies even more harsh than they already are.
The appellant, as a beneficiary to the insurance contract
between the appellees and Utah Title and Abstract Company, should
not now be penalized for Utah Title's failure to make timely notice
under the policy requirements. There is a significant line of case
law recognizing the specific rights of beneficiaries to insurance
contracts, with specific rights to be protected thereunder. In
Regagor v. Travellers Insurance Co., 415 NE.2d 512 (111. 1980) it
was held:
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An insured person has rights under the policy which vests
at the time of the occurrence giving rise to its
"injuries". . . the injured person must be given the
opportunity to litigate the coverage under the liability
insurance policy before its interest in the insurance can
be terminated. (p. 514)
See also: State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Kendall,
122 SE.2d 139 (Ga 1961) (Attempted recision of an automobile
liability policy by the named insured and his insurer could not
defeat the right of the injured person under the policy);
Travellers Insurance Co. v. Perez, 384 S.2d 971 (Fl. App. 3rd
Dist., 1980) (Bad faith insurance claim allowed by third-party
beneficiary); In accord: Hall v. Harleysville Mutual Casualty
Co., 64 SE.2d 160 (NC 1951).
The preservation of the rights of beneficiaries to insurance
contracts falls in line with the general argument against insurance
policies as adhesion contracts between parties not equally
situated. See, e.g.: Steven v. Fidelity and Ensign Casualty Co.
of New York, 377 P.2d 284 (Calif. 1962). The court also stated:
Because insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion,
the terms of which are not customarily bargained for,
courts have a special responsibility to prevent the
marketing of policies that provide unrealistic and
inadequate coverage.
Utah should agree with a majority of state courts holding
that, absent a of showing of prejudice to the insurer, notice of
loss under an insurance policy need not be given within a specified
time period even in the face of an insured' s unreasonable or
unexcused delay or omission in giving notice. See: Zuckersnan v.
Trans American Co., 650 P.2d 441 (Ariz. 1982); Fidelity Savings &
Loan Association v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 647 Fed.2d 933 (CA
13
9 Calif. 1981); Cooper v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 237
A.2d 870 (New Jersey 1968). Further, the burden of proof
concerning prejudice to the insurer falls on the insurer. Globe
Indemnity Co. v. Blonfield, 562 P.2d 1372 (Ariz.App.1977).
The trial court failed to address the legal issues raised by
the appellant at the lower level and failed to give the appellant
an opportunity to discover whether or not the insurance company had
received constructive or actual knowledge of the claim which was
filed by the appellant against Utah Title and Abstract Company.
In addition, the trial court failed to address the factual issue
of whether the appellees received reasonable notice and were
prejudiced by the failure to receive earlier notice. An
examination of the transcript of the lower courts decision, a copy
of which is attached, demonstrates that Judge Stanton M. Taylor did
not give any serious considerations to the legal or factual issue
raised in the lower court.
The affidavit of George M. Grulke, filed in support of the
appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment, claims that the absence of
notice to the appellees until such notice was given by the
appellant in June, 1988, deprives the appellees of "the opportunity
to do the kinds of things that we routinely do in handling claims
or to be involved in any way in the claim of AOK Lands" (Grulke
Affidavit, Para. 8) However, Mr. Grulke's Affidavit fails to
establish sufficient prejudice to the insurer to now make this
policy unenforceable as to the appellant. Most obviously, trial
of the action between Utah Title and the appellant and the
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discovery conducted thereunder, should provide sufficient
information to the appellees in the form of documentation,
depositions, witnesses' testimony on record, etc. Appellees also
have failed to deny they have sufficient documentation within their
own possession to enable them to proceed in the present action.
Appellees simply have not carried the burden of proof as to
prejudice in this matter; and, consequently, should not have been
awarded summary judgment.
POINT III
THE "CLAIMS MADE" PROVISION OF THE INSURANCE POLICY
VIOLATES PUBLIC POLICY AND IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
A "claims made" policy violates public policy which requires
that an adhesion contract be carefully examined to determine
whether or not it protects the public which may be injured by the
insured. As indicated in Point II, as injured party of the insured
is a beneficiary and has rights under a policy of insurance which
vests at the time that he is injured. If an injured party is not
given a reasonable opportunity to recover under a liability
insurance contract because of the terms of that contract, then the
contract violates public policy and one of the purposes for the
existence of an insurance contract. A professional liability
insurance contract is purchased for the purpose of protecting the
insured and to protect the party who is dealing with the
professional. An unreasonable limitation upon the coverage of the
insurance contract does not protect the insured nor his client;
and, therefore, serves no useful purpose for the public. The Utah
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Constitution, Article I, Section 11 protects the rights of citizens
to maintain an action for injury. The Utah Supreme Court, in Berry
v Beach Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) made the following
statement about this section of the Constitution:
Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution is part
of the Declaration of Rights. It declares that an
individual shall have a right to "remedy by due course
of law" for injury to "person, property, or reputation."
Specifically, that section states:
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property, or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this state, by himself
or counsel any civil cause to which he is a party. "
(p.674)
The Utah Supreme Court held that a statute of repose was
unconstitutional because it did not allow reasonable time for the
filing of an action after a cause of action arose. In this regard,
the court stated:
Since a statute of repose begins to run from a date
unrelated to the date of an injury, it is not designed
to allow a reasonable time for the filing of an action
once it arises. Therefore,, a statute of repose may bar
the filing of a lawsuit even though the cause of action
did not even arise until after it was barred and even
though the injured person was diligent in seeking a
judicial remedy. Section 3 of the Utah Product Liability
Act bars actions without regard to when an injury occurs
and is not designed to provide a reasonable time within
which to file a lawsuit. Indeed, a statute of repose may
cut off a cause of action even though it is filed within
the period allowed by the relevant statute of
limitations. (p. 672)
It is the position of the appellant that the language of a
"claims made" policy is similar to a statute of repose. If the
language is enforceable, it terminates the right of an action by
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the insured or the beneficiary of the insured from a date that is
unrelated to the injury and may bar a recovery by the insured or
the insured's beneficiary even though an action was fi1ed within
a period allowed by the relevant statute of limitations for an
injury that was not known to the insured or the beneficiary until
after the cutoff date.
The court went on to state as follows:
A constitutional guarantee of access to the
courthouse was not intended by the founders to be an
empty gesture; individuals are also entitled to a remedy
by "due course of law" for injuries to "person, property,
or reputation." (p. 675)
The court held that under the constitutional provision, an
injured party must be afforded an effective and reasonable remedy
and that remedy may only be abrogated
. . . if there is a clear social or economic evil to be
eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal
remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for
achieving the object. . . . (p. 680)
The Berry case and other cases of the Supreme Court dealing
with the Statute of Repose have dealt with the right of an
individual or a tort feasor and have not specifically discussed the
rights of the injured party against insurance maintained by the
tort feasor. See also: Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775
P.2d 348 (Utah, 1989); and Horton v Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d
1087 (Utah, 1989). However, the appellant contends that the state
constitutional provisions and the reasoning referred to in the
Berry case are equally applicable to a beneficiary under the tort
feasor's insurance contract. In today's world, denying an injured
party access to the tort feasor's insurance coverage is in effect
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a denial of recovery for injuries and, therefore, a denial of a
remedy by due course of law for injuries.
The courts in the United States have refused to enforce the
terms of insurance contracts when it is determined that the
provisions of the contracts were in violation of public policy.
The enforceability of a "claims made" insurance contract was
considered by the court in the case of Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co.,
495 A.2d 406 (N.J. 1985). In that case Notice of Claim, although
untimely as required by the actual terms of the policy, was
submitted by the insured's attorney, six months after the attorney
negligently allowed a default judgment to be entered against his
clients relating to the sale of their residence. The New Jersey
Supreme Court weighed the facts that the Notice of Claim was made
within a reasonable time after the policy had expired and the
underlying act of obvious malpractice and ordered that coverage
under the policy be invoked. The court stated:
The realities of professional malpractice, however,
suggest that it would be the rare instance in which an
error occurred and was discovered with sufficient time
to report it to the insurance company, all within a
twelve month period. The victims of professional
malpractice are frequently unaware of any negligence
until their injury becomes manifest long after the error
or omission was committed. (p. 415)
The court reviewed legal precedence and quoted the following
statement concerning public policy:
"[Pjublic policy" is that principle of law which holds
that "no person can lawfully do that which has a tendency
to be injurious to the public or against public good .
. . ." even though "no actual injury" may have resulted
therefrom in a particular case "to the public." It is
a question of law which the court must decide in light
of the particular circumstances of each case.
(P-412)
The court went on to state:
[2] The doctrine that courts do not lightly interfere
with freedom of contract must be applied cautiously and
realistically with regard to complex contracts of
insurance, since such contracts are highly technical,
extremely difficult to understand, and not subject to
bargaining over the terms. They are contracts of
adhesion, prepared unilaterally by the insurer, and have
always been subjected to careful judicial scrutiny to
avoid injury to the public . . . (p. 412)
When members of the public purchase policies of insurance
they are entitled to the broad measure of protection
necessary to fulfill their reasonable expectations. They
should not be subjected to technical encumbrances or to
hidden pitfalls and their policies should be construed
liberally in their favor to the end that coverage is
afforded "to the full extent that any fair interpretation
will allow." Francis, J., in Danek v. Hommer, 28
N.J.Super. 68, 76 [100 A.2d 198] (App. Div. 1953 ), affirmed
15 N.J. 573 [105 A. 2d 677] (1954) . Where particular
provisions, if read literally, would largely nullify the
insurance, they will be severely restricted so as to
enable fair fulfillment of the stated policy objective.
... (p. 413-414)
The Sparks case reviewed the history of "claims made" policies
and commented that there are two types of errors and omissions
policies. One is a discovery policy where the coverage only
applies if the negligence is brought to the attention of the
insurance company during the period of the policy. The other is
an occurrence policy where the insurance company is liable if the
negligence occurred during the period of the policy regardless of
when it is discovered. (p. 409). The court went on to conclude
that in order for an insurance policy not to be in violation of a
public policy, it must either provide prospective coverage or
retroactive coverage. The court concluded that an occurrence
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policy did not violate public policy because it provides
prospective coverage and that a "claims made" contract may not
violate public policy if it provided retroactive coverage. Under
the specific fact circumstances existing in the Sparks case, the
insurance policy did not provide either prospective or retroactive
coverage; and, therefore, was in violation of public policy. The
court stated:
We do not decide in this case the precise standard by
which the reasonableness of retroactive coverage is to
be measured. We hold, however, that where there has been
no proof of factual circumstances that would render such
limited retroactive coverage both reasonable and
expected, a "claims made" policy that affords no
retroactive coverage whatsoever during its initial year
of issuance does not accord with the objectively,
reasonable expectations of the purchasers of professional
liability insurance. The fact that subsequent renewals
of that policy provide minimal retroactive coverage,
i.e., to the effective date of the original policy, does
not cure the significant deficiency inherent in the
underlying policy.
To enforce policies that provide such unrealistically
narrow coverage to professionals, and, derivatively, to
the public they serve, would in our view cause the kind
of broad injury to the public at large contemplated by
the doctrine that precludes the enforcement of contracts
that violate public policy. See Allen v. Commercial Cas.
Ins. Col, supra, 131 N.J.L. at 477-78, 37 A.2d 37. Put
another way, were we to uphold the validity of St. Paul's
policy in this case, the likely result would be the
perpetuation of the professional liability insurance
market of "claims made" policies offering comparably
limited coverage. Because insurance contracts are
contracts of adhesion, the terms of which are not
customarily bargained for, courts have a special
responsibility to prevent the marketing of policies that
provide unrealistic and inadequate coverage. (p.415)
The New Jersey Court, in a case ruled on at approximately the
same time entitled Zuckerman v. National Union Fire Insurance
Company, 495 A.2d 395 (N.J. 1985) held that a "claims made" policy
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which did provide effective retroactive coverage was not in
violation of public policy. It could be argued that neither the
Zuckerman or the Sparks case support the appellant's contention
that the Utah Supreme Court should strike down the "claims made"
policy in this case as being in violation of public policy.
However, the appellant believes that there were issues which were
not raised before the New Jersey Court and terms of the insurance
contract which may not have existed in the New Jersey cases. If
the reasoning of the New Jersey cases is based upon the fact that
an insurance policy must provide some realistic coverage to an
insured and to the insured's beneficiary, then all reasonable
possibilities must be considered in determining whether or not the
beneficiary will be able to collect against the insurance policy.
In the case before this court, Utah Title and Abstract Company
maintained a "claims made" policy for a period of two years. When
it purchased insurance for the year of 1977, it acquired a
retroactive coverage which purported to protect any parties who
were injured prior to 1977. However, an examination of the actual
language of the insurance contract will demonstrate that coverage
was illusory. Part of the language under Paragraph 1 of the
section entitle "The Coverage" states as follows:
. . . This policy applies to CLAIMS FIRST MADE AGAINST
THE INSURED DURING THE POLICY PERIOD, arising from
professional services performed: (a) during the policy
period, or (b) prior to the effective date of this
insurance provided the insured has no knowledge of any
claim or suit, or any act, error or omission that may
result in a claim or suit, as of the date of signing the
application for this insurance and there is no previous
policy or policies under which the insured is entitled
to indemnity for such claim or suit.
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Subparagraph (b) eliminates any retroactive coverage if the insured
has knowledge of a claim or an act, error, or omission which could
give rise to a claim. Therefore, the insurance policy only gives
retroactive coverage if the insured has not been notified or does
not know that it committed an act, error, or omission that could
give rise to a suit. There may be occasions when the insured would
not know that they had committed a negligent act. However, there
are many occasions when the insured would know that they had
committed a negligent act, in which case there would be no
prospective or retroactive coverage for the acts of the insured.
Under the language of the Sparks case, this would seem to be a
clear violation of public policy.
A "claims made" contract does not provide for many of the
conditions that routinely occur in real life. It cannot always be
assumed that an insured will purchase a "claims made" insurance
contract year after year. If the insured does not purchase a
contract on each successive year, then the injured party is denied
recovery unless the claim has been made during the last one year
term of the insurance contract.. An insured may not purchase a
subsequent insurance policy because of death, incompetency,
insolvency, termination of a business, or other circumstances,
economic or otherwise. If any of these conditions occur, then an
injured party who does not learn about the injury until after the
term of the "claims made" contract has expired, is denied recovery
from the insurance proceeds which were purchased to protect the
insured's beneficiary. Under these circumstances, the "claims
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made" insurance contract would not provide prospective or
retroactive benefits to the insured or its beneficiary and
therefore would seem to be in violation of the principals set down
in the Sparks case.
It is the position of the appellant that both the insured and
the insured's beneficiary has a right of reasonable expectations
from an insurance policy and that the reasonable expectations are
not covered by the "claims made" policy which is the subject matter
of this lawsuit. The sole purpose of a "claims made" policy and
the language contained therein is to protect the insurance company;
and since the insurance policy is an adhesion contract which does
not allow the insured or the public to negotiate its terms, it
should be declared a violation of public policy and/or a violation
of the constitutional provisions of the Utah Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The appellant contends that the decision of the lower court
granting summary judgment to the appellees should be reversed and
that this court should rule that the "claims made" policy in this
case, by its terms, provides that an action may be brought
prospectively under its coverage. In the alternative, the
appellant requests that this court declare the "claims made" policy
in this case to be in violation of public policy and in violation
of the Utah Constitution. As a beneficiary of the insured, the
appellant should not be denied the right or access to the insurance
23
proceeds for a negligent act which occurred during the term of the
policy.
The appellant respectfully requests that the court reverse the
lower court's decision, rule that the appellant's claim is timely,
and direct the lower court to enter judgment against the appellees
to the extent of the insurance coverage for the damages suffered
by the appellant which remain unpaid.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of May, 1992.
ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify four (4) true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was mailed, postage prepaid, this
day of May, 1992, to Richard L. Evans, Jr. and Jay E. Jensen,
Attorneys for Defendants, 175 South West Temple, Suite 510, Salt
Lake City, UT 84101.
ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNT'/
STATE OF UTAH
AOK LANDS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CASE NO. 890903067
OGDEN, UTAH
AUGUST 19, .1991
SHAND, MORAHAN & COMPANY,
and MUTUAL FIRE, MARINE &
INLAND INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.
COURT'S RULING
HONORABLE STANTON M. TAYLOR, PRESIDING
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
FOR THE DEFENDANTS
MR. ROBERT -A. ECHARD
MR. ROB HUNT, also present
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD
635 - 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
MR. RICHARD L. EVANS, JR.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN &
POWELL, P.C.
175 South West Temple,
Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R.
Official Court Reporter
2549 Washington Boulevard
Sixth Floor
Ogden, Utah 84401
(301) 399-8510
1
Exsin^t fl
1 THE COURT: Well, interesting. I'm not
2 sure I'm prepared at this point, Mr. Echard, to say that
3 "claims-made" policies are a violation of public policy
4 and outlaw them in the State of Utah. I'd prefer to
5 leave that to the.appellate courts.
6 Secondly, I don't think this is a third-party
7 beneficiary contract. A third-party beneficiary
8 contract is entered into for the benefit of the third
9 party. This is a contract of indemnity, and it seems to
10 me that Utah Mortgage entered into the contract for
11 their own benefit, not for some third party, although it
12 may very well be that they are benefited by the
13 contract. But I think third-party beneficiary is a term
14 of art that would be a little more restrictive.
•15 I guess I r— I have a little concern that — that
16 if you have a cause of action, it's kind of a derivative
17 action based upon the rights of the title company, and
18 I'm not- sure that — that the law would allow you
19 greater rights than the title company would have over
20 the policy.
2i It occurs to me even if we're talking about a •—
22 a statute of limitations — even assuming that
23 limitations apply to this type of cause of action — it
24 seems to me that — that the limitation period would
25 have run before this defendant was given notice.
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MR. ECHARD: It's three years to bring
an action under the statute of limitations.
THE COURT: Well, I know, but see, the
three years would have been into the early — early
'no's and this — these folks weren't notified until
' 88 .
MR. ECHARD: We filed a lawsuit --
THE COURT: But see, we're not talking
about — we're talking about a limitation period
relating to their liability, not the liability of Utah
Mortgage. We're talking about two different things.
And it seems to me that even — even assuming
limitations applies, it would have — the limitation
period of the liability of these folks to Utah Mortgage
would have run, even if the four-year period applies, in
what, 1983 or something.
MR ECHARD: I don't know if that's a
request for response. I won't respond unless the —
THE COURT: No, not really. I'm kind
of going through the process.
The motion for summary judgment is granted.
MR. ECHARD: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: A tough case.
MR. ECHARD: I think we'll probably get
the Supreme Court to decide it yet.
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THE COURT: Well, I think that's nice.
(WHEREUPON, at this time there's an
off-the-record discussion, after which proceedings
resume as follows:)
THE COURT: That's not the whole basis
for my decision, and I want that as part of the record.
MR. ECHARD: Well, I would appreciate
it if you do that because I'll obviously have to address
that if I appeal it.
THE COURT: My — I make these comments
as just kind of a gratuitous aside. And my feeling is
that both the — that both of the grounds outlined by
Counsel, the non-notification, the prejudice issue and
the other issue that was addressed by Counsel, that --
that was the basis for my decision.
These other things were just kind of in response
to some of the things that you had raised and was not
really -the whole basis for my decision.
MR. ECHARD: Okay. Thank you, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
(WHEREUPON, at this time proceedings in the
above-entitled matter concluded.)
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CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH )
) ss.
COUNTY OF WEBER )
I, Laurie Shingle, do hereby certify that the
foregoing four pages of transcript constitute
a true and accurate record of the proceedings to the
best of my knowledge and ability as an Official Court
Reporter for the Second Judicial District Court of Weber
County in and for the State of Utah.
Dated at Ogden, Utah, this the 2.Q day of
August, 1991.
CUMLL
Laurie Shingle , C.S.?J.
•vv
>o
Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 26S0!
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0003
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Brant H. Wall
WALL & WALL
9 Exchange Place, S800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-8220
Attorneys for Defendant
Utah Title & bstract Company
'.,. \r.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*******
AOK LANDS, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
WHITE BARN DEVELOPMENT
ASSOCIATES, a General partner
ship, LAWRENCE H. BARNEY,
J. DOUGLAS BOWERS and BOWERS-
SORENSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC., and UTAH TITLE & ABSTRACT
COMPANY,
Defendants.
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT
Civil No. 74041
*******
\j
The above entitled action came on regularly for trial before the Honorable Ronald
O. Hyde, District Judge, on the 13th day of November, 1986, the plaintiff appearing
through and being represented by its attorney, Robert A. Echard, the defendant, White
Barn Development Associates being represented by its attorney, Bruce L. Dibb, and the
defendant Utah Title and Abstract Company being represented by its attorney, Richard
A. Rappaport, the court proceeded to empanel a jury to try the issues.
A jury was selected and duly sworn to try the issues of fact. During the course of
the trial, the court upon stipulation of the parties, bifurcated the case reserving the issue
of damages to be heard by a subsequent jury. The court submitted the issues of Liability
and causation to the jury. After due deliberation, the jury on the 25th day of November,
198G, returned into open court the following verdict, to-wit:
"QUESTION NO. 1: Was the defendant, Utah Title negligent in handling oi
plaintiffs interest?
ANSWER: Yes.
QUESTION NO,. 2: Was defendant's negligence, if any, a proximate cause of the
damages suffered by the plaintiff?
ANSWER: Yes.
QUESTION NO. 3: Was plaintiff, AOK Lands, negligent?
ANSWER: Yes.
QUESTION NO. 4: Was plaintiffs negligence, if any, a proximate cause of the
damages suffered by the plaintiff?
ANSWER: Yes.
QUESTION NO. 5: Considering all of the negligence at 10096, which percentage of
that negligence is attributable to AOK Lands?
ANSWER: 20%
Utah Title? 80%
QUESTION NO. 6: Was White Barn Negligent?
ANSWER: No.
A jury was selected and duly sworn to try the issues of damages. After due
deliberation, the jury on the Sth day of September, 1987, returned into open court the
following verdict:
""We, the jury impaneled to try the issues in the above-entitled case, find -\-
follows:
Damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate cause of the negligence:
$500,000.00"
That the parties, by stipulation, agreed not to submit to the jury deliberating on
damages, the question of a pre-judgment interest; but to reserve for determination by
the court whether or not pre-judgment interest should be added to any damages
determined by the jury. The parties, pursuant to said stipulation have submitted to the
court memorandums in support of their positions concerning pre-judgment interest.
NOW THEREFORE, based upon the verdict of the jnry and good cause being
shown, it Ls
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1. That Utah Title and Abstract Company was negligent to the extent of 80%,
that said negligence was the proximate cause of the damages suffered by the plaintiff.
2. That the plaintiff, AOK Lands, Inc. was negligent to the extent of 20% and
said negligence was the proximate cause of the damages suffered by the plaintiff.
3. That White Barn Development Associates was not negligent with respect to
the crossclaim of Utah Title.
4. That the damages suffered by AOK Lands as of 1979 was $500,000.00.
5. That pursuant to the determination of the jury, the plaintiff is awarded a
judgment against the defendant, Utah Title and Abstract Company in the sum o:
$400,000.00
-3-
6. That the plaintiff is not awarded pre-judgment interest on the damages
awarded to the plaintiff by the jury.
DATED this 1$day of r/eceTmber, 198?.
BY THE.COURT:
RONALD O. HYDE
Disfjxict Court Judge
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
#
Proposed Judgment on Verdict was hand delivered on the ^' day of December, 1987, to:
(AOK-12)
Robert A. Echard, Esq.
635 -25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
-4-
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WEBER
I HERESY CERTIFY THAT THIS A TRUE COP
OF THE ORIGINAL ON FiL'3 IN,
DATED THIS ^^CAT) OF, .,-_,. ,
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Richard L. Evans, Jr., #1016
Jay E. Jensen, #1676
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
AOK LANDS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SHAND, MORAHAN & COMPANY, and
MUTUAL FIRE, MARINE & INLAND
INSURANCE CO.,
Defendants.
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORIES
AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS
Civil No. 890903067CV
Defendants Shand, Morahan & Company ("Shand Morahan") and
|i Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Insurance Co. ("Mutual Fire") respond
jj to plaintiff s Interrogatories and Request for Production of
'i
i; Documents as follows:
I; INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. l: State whether or not the defendants,
1]'• individually and/or collectively ever issued and error and omission
ji policy of insurance for Utah Title and Abstract Company. If so,
state the following:
(a) The number of times Utah Title and Abstract was
insured or the number of policies issued for said company.
Exhibit C
issued.
(b) The date or dates on which the polices were issued.
(c) The period of coverage for each policy that was
(d) The amount of the policy.
(e) The coverage of each policy.
(f) Whether or not the policy was a claims made policy,
and if so the specific terms and conditions contained in the policy
concerning the claims made provision.
ANSWER: (a) Mutual Fire, acting through its agent, Shand
Morahan, issued two errors and omissions policies to Utah Title and
Abstract Company.
(b) These defendants have not been able to ascertain
the specific dates on which the policies were issued, but the
periods of coverage are known (see subsection (c) below).
(c) The first policy was in effect from February 5,
1976 to February 5, 1977, and the second policy was in effect from
February 5, 1977 to February 5, 1978.
(d) The policy limits of each policy were $100,000 per
claim and $200,000 in the aggregate during the policy period.
(e) True and correct copies of the two policies are
attached hereto as Exhibits A and B, respectively. The coverage
can be determined from a reading of those policies.
(f) Each of the two policies was a "claims made"
policy. Each policy states: "This policy applies to CLAIMS FIRST
MADE AGAINST THE INSURED DURING THE POLICY PERIOD ....*'
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: As to each policy set forth in your
answer to Interrogatory No. 1, state the relationship, if any,
between Shand, Morahan & Company and Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland
Insurance Company. Also state whether or not Shand, Morahan &
Company held themselves out to be personally liable for claims made
under the policies set forth in Paragraph 1. If not, state as
follows:
(a) What documents, if any, are in existence limiting
Shand, Morahan & Company's liability on any policies issued as
agent or in conjunction with Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Insurance
Company.
(b) What notice, if any, was given to the insured, Utah
Title and /Abstract Company, or to parties claiming under the
insurance policy that Shand Morahan & Company was not personally
liable for the policies that were written.
(c) Contents of any notices or documents referred to
in Subsections (a) and (b) of this question.
ANSWER: As to each of the two policies, Shand Morahan, in the
issuance of those policies, acted as agent for Mutual Fire, Shand
Morahan's function being that of an "underwriting manager." Shand
Morahan did not hold itself out as being personally liable for
claims made under either of those two policies.
(a) These defendants are not presently aware of any
documents which expressly limit Shand Morahan's liability on
policies which it issued as agent of Mutual Fire, but it is well
established law that if a contract is made with an agent acting for
a disclosed principal, the contract is that of the principal alone,
and the agent cannot be held liable thereon. Persons to whom
policies were issued were informed, of the insurance company for
whom Shand Morahan was acting in the issuance of such policies.
That information was given in the "cover note" sent to the insured
in connection with each such policy and was also given in the
policy itself and in any endorsements thereto.
(b) See answer above to Interrogatory 2(a). It was
disclosed to Utah Title and /Abstract Company that the insurer under
the two policies in question was Mutual Fire. That disclosure was
made, for example, in the Cover Note issued to Utah Title in
connection with each of the policies. In each of those Cover Notes
Shand Morahan states to the insured (Utah Title): "Acting upon
your instructions, we have effected insurance as noted below with
Insurer(s) as scheduled below", and below on that same page the
insurer is stated to be "Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Insurance
Co." The name of Mutual Fire also appears conspicuously on the
first page of the body of each policy, where Mutual Fire is
designated as the "Insurer" and where it also states that Mutual
Fire is "herein called the Company," and then the body of the
policy sets forth the various obligations of the "Company" (Mutual
Fire) to the insured under the policy. The name of Mutual Fire
also appears on the endorsements to the two policies. (See the
Cover Notes, policies and endorsements in Exhibits A and B hereto.)
(c) See answer above to Interrogatory 2(b), and see
Exhibits A and B attached hereto.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION
REQUEST 1: Produce any and all documents referred to in
answers to plaintiff's interrogatories above.
ANSWER: Copies of the two policies referred to above are attached
hereto as Exhibits A and B.
REQUEST 2: Produce copies of any and all policies issued to
Utah Title and Abstract Company by Shand, Morahan & Company and/or
Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Insurance Company.
ANSWER: Copies of the two policies referred to above are attached
hereto as Exhibits A and B.
DATED this (dt day of January, 1990.
SHAND, MORAHAN & COMPANY and
MUTUAL FIRE, MARINE & INLAND
INSURANCE CO.
Michael HarriS
Senior Claim Attorney for
Shand Morahan and Agent for
Mutual Fire
STATE OF ILLINOIS :
ss.
COUNTY OF COOK :
On the I oTk day of January, 1990, personally appeared
before me Michael Harris for and on behalf of defendants Shand,
Morahan & Company and Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Insurance Co..,
who duly acknowledged to me that he is Senior Claim Attorney for
Shand Morahan, and is the agent of Mutual Fire pursuant to Rule 33
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the purpose of providing
the above responses to plaintiffs Interrogatories and Request for
Production of Documents, that he signed and executed the foregoing
responses and that the same are true and correct to the best of his
information, knowledge and belief.
My commission expires:
/
U<_
Notary Public -^ /.
Residing at: d&o-£- Co^^^-r. 4-&^^
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prokksstwiai. liability kisimanck.
declarations
®
r./imed ; n.'turo'J Utah Title and -Abstract Company
2, Address of. Insured; 629 East -.h South, SnlL Lake City, Utah 84102
2.- Cover Nolo I'orlod: From: February 5, 1976to February 5, 1977
17, AW A.M. standard Tirno at ndoress ol Ln.sur<_*ci
stated above
I.Im'Il of Liability;
The li.abll i. ty of the Company Cor each claim under this cover
noi:c sha 11 not exceed $ 100,000
And, subject to thnt limit Cor onch clnb, the total limit of
the Company's liability for all claims durlnr, £he cycr note
ncrloci shall not exceed-in the figs rebate .5 200 ,'jCO '
Deduct l.b Ic : App LI cable to each claim:
Title Abstracters $ 1»000
tie Insurance Agents $ 1 nno
Com pan io r^ Represented : SAFr.n TJf.ln Insurance Co.
Persons rendering title opinion:
Alfred J. Newman
I'rem iurn: (a) Title Abstracters $ 1,494,00
(b) Title Insurance Agent 730.00
(c) Title Opinion 43.00
TOTAL rRFMIUAS: .? 2,322.00
r.ovcu'<i;;c for Items (a),(b) and (c) applies only if /< specific
pi:c!!] Uim charr,c Is ind lea Led .
Except tn such extent as may ho provided otherwise herein, the coverage of
this cnvnr note is limited generally to liability Cor only those claims that
nrc l'\ iv; i. m.'idc agn inst the Insured wh ile the cover note Is in force, I'I case
review the cover note carefully find discuss the coverage thereunder with your
insurance agent or broker.
Endorsements Attached : 1. Amendatory 2. Specific Exclus ions
All claims to he Reported directly to:
Shand , Morah/in t. Co., 1nc .
•I'll Davis St., Kvauscon, 111. '60201
.112)366-9010
AMENDATORY ' '.UOKSIuMLNT
I.. ci:n-.iu..'i-atinii of tlic premium pa Id, it In hereby understood and agreed
hat the section entitled 'HIE COVERAGE is hereby amended to read:'
1. Coverage: '1 o pay on behalf of the Insured nil sums that the Insured
shall 'Hjcoir.: legally obligated to pay as damages as a result of any
claim--, made again-;': the Insured by reason of any act, error nr omission
In professional services rendered'or which should have been rendered by
the Insured, his employees or by others for whom the Insured lb liable,
in the conduct of the Insured's profession as:
(a) a title abstracter, provided n specific premium charge is In
dicated on the Declarations pure hereof. C'llils Insuring Agree
ment includes M3 a part of professional services of an abstracter
such memoranda, certificates Issued in lieu of abstracts, notes
and references to chains of title as woi1 as name scorches, tax
and assessment searches that nrc furnished or compiled by ab
stracters as a basis foynn examiner's inspection.)
(b) a title Insurance agent for the titLo Insurance companies
shown in the Declarations provLdcd a specific prciruum choree is
indicated on the Declarations paye hereof.
(cj a person who renders opinions of title, provided said opinions
are based upon an abstract of title furnished or rendered by
the eniployee( s) or partner(a) named en Lhc Declarations page
hereof and provided a specific premium charge is indicated on
tin.* Declarations page hereof.
No' wi thslainl ing the above, it is a condition precedent to coverage under
Lhc policy that /ill claims lie reported In compliance with tiic provisions
of section CLAIMS 1 - Notice of Claim or Suit,
This policy applies to CLAIMS FIRST MADE AGAINST Till-: INSUUI'J) DURING THE
POLICY S'EKIOD, arising, from profession'.!I services performed.
(a) during the policy period, or
(b) prior to the effective date of this insurance provided the -
insurod had no knowledge of any claim or suit, or any act, error
or omission that might result Ln a claim or suit, as of the date
of r, i.gnl ng the appI' cat! on for th 1s Insuranee and there is no
previous poI iey or po11c ies under which the Insured is cnti tLed
to indemnity for such claim or suit.
All oLh-'A terms and condi11 uns remain the same.
Endorsement No. 1 CN 502107 Mutual Fire, Marine &
Attached to and l.'ormLug part of No. of the Inland Insurance Company
SHAND, MORAHAN f* COMPANY, INC.
&
?ELSS&ai:
A
.^^^^^^
Q
SPECIFIC EXCLUSIONS
In consideration of tho premium paid, it is
hereby understood and agreed that NO covaraga
is afforded hcraundor for opinions rendered
as to validity of titles based on abstracts
of others, escrow activitloi and closing services
rendered.
All other terms and conditions remain tho same.
CNHOIlSt Ufc'NT NO. 2
m
AM -tiPirx ti-'iiu ,v»(l L-'tn-liliKiu rUti.ilNlng nncti*nyoiJ.
CN502107
Atl/i'.tii'd to L-nr| famiHty \w\ u( No.. .,. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co, ^>
issue n rn ...
Utah Title and Abstract Co.
February 5, 1976
$H/\NQ, MOMAMAN S COMPANY, INC,
Shand, Morahan &Company, Inc.
Professional Liability Insurance Policy
for Specified Professions
Underwriting Manager: Shand, Morahan &Company, Inc., One American Plaza, Evanston, Illinois 60201
Insurer:
WTP The Mutual Fire, Marine and
7$^ Inland Insurance Company
m ia ca (A mutual insurance company, herein called the Company,
which is a non-admitted insurer, writing pursuant to the surplus
lines laws and not under the jurisdiction of the Insurance Commissioner.
Suite 1200 Three Parkway Philadelphia, PA 19103
^ -' '•= davmnnt of ihe premium ih-a :;r.cer.a< • g of ::~e injured to pav '-n d-ductiS^ as d^scr p->d --em and A
v.n :r :>-q J.jc.j'.Tiioni in ft'iMn^-? ^on '~8 st-.ements in ire applica'.ion attached -e-e'o and .-ado a -art hereof,
t">? '.mils df liabKit, snown .n :he CdCarpfons, and 5l-;gc: to all tho terms el \""> "S-j'S-zo. ^o Company aprees
'?_ _ ?!
S a ti ••>*«• 3nw^,d A J
1„ '""" -""3 '•^•""' '"5u-ed' ^ne^r .;:.vj. -earns -c; ~-:, !r(} -Jarred insured gu: -so 3nv pe-sp.n wo- ~ay bo 3 partner,
c • -er, c.•-.-:.cr. s:ad-,.nc :er or emr ovee wni..> ac:.^ .-.f-.n the scope of h-s duties as :-jc".
2 - •-.* °.n! d' i-v.b incapacity or bankruptcy c* any insured, the legal representative C nv ?,.:-• i-su-?v -:5 capacity =5
s„cr. Si"3ii do ar\ additional Insured hereunder.
The Coverage
1. Coverage: To oav en r**a\1 of tnP insured a'! sjn3 that the Insured snail become (ecviv cfpated :o 02; as damaces as 3 r»-
su-t d! anv c a.ms m.ipn spams: 'he Insured dy '?3scn of any 50I error or omission in prdfess.cnai services '?"de-ed or ,vmcn She.' d
havp ceen rendered dy the Insured, his employees or dy othars for .vnom tho Insured Is iiao.a in the conduc: ct the Ins^pg a pro
fession asp
\a) ^";|9 ao-sinptrjr :Th.3 Insuring Agreement mpiudes as a pari of professional serving of an ipsi-actpr Vjc.n memoranda cer-
! f'cr^s n:,u.-d 1-1 '•"!) c( abstracts n^'«s i-d r?fefenc(?i to crams of tnio as .veil is rn» searcnes. :,n and assessment
sear^es ;.-vil are tumished or compiled by abstracters as a basis for an examiPT s m-oectic.n.l
'':;) 3 ' :l" "franco addnt tor the title insurance companies shown in the Ceclarat'ons provided :09Pi:p premium cna.-pa is Indi
cated on 'he Cec'araf'cns page rereof.
•'•rt.'.d^s'a-d r- :-0 acce. t is a cpnmticn precedent to cove'ace under this policy thai a.I crr-s oe -e:;.':=a n ppmp'iance wn --p
p-o.'s c-s d! sept.on CLAi.'.'S 1 — Nance of C 31m or Suit.
I!l'LD°'"CJ. at?P';eS t0 CLAIl'J3 F:RST MADE AGAINST THE INSURED DUR1N3 THE POLICY PEPICD, pnsmg from professional services
(a) during Iho policy period, or
(b) pnor 10 tho ei'eohve date of this insurarco provided the Insured had no knowledge of any claim cr suit, cr any ar; error m
omission that might result ma claim or su.t, as of '.he oats of signing the appucano.n for this msu.-arce and tnare Is n"o
p.-e.ious =c,icy cr pc'ici-s under '.vnich ;he ,'nsuied is ent:!ied Id indemnity Ar such c a-m or suit.
2. 0e!er.5e, Setilemont, Supplementary Payments:
A) The Ccmcanv shaJ defond any suit agamst tho Insured seeing damap-as Ic wnicn this insurance aop'^s «v«»n if any of thg
ai.eaat.cns cf trip suit are groundless, !a,so or fraudulent and it is agreed that the Company mav ma*e 3ucn mvesuranon and
settlement 0! any cia.m or suit as they oeem expedient, suo.iect to 2(b) of this section, but :rB Company snail not bo'oDiigated
to pay any cfaim or |udgment or to defend any suit after the applicable limit ol the Company's liability has boon tendored to
the Insured or exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements.
(b) The Ccmparv shall not settle any claim without the consent of the Insured. If. however, trc Insured Shall r.-'-so to consent
to any sett'emert recommended by 'he Company and s.-.aii elect to contest tho c:am or to centime zr.w '?d3l prcc«eain-s
in ccnnecticn v.rth such claim, then the Company's liab.lit/ 'cr tho claim shail ret exceed t~e a~p„m: 'C: .w-cn '^e ciar-
CdL-d navy oecn :o sciMed plus c'aims expenses .rcdrred up to the date ol such rg'l.saL Z-^zr> ampun'.s are sl-'sc' 'o *-«
previsions df the LIMITS CF LIABILITY sec'.icn of this pol,cy. "' ' ''
(c) Tho Company shall pay in addition 10 ihr; 3pp;icable limits of liability all claims o-censes and 'ees and expenses of Indg '
pendent adiuslers incurred with tho consent of the Company, provided however, that >n ins event a payment in excess of the"
_an-iount of the limits of liability available under this Insurance is to bo made to d^ooso of a 0:31m. the Company 3 harjihiv 'cr
such claims expenses and fees and expenses of indeoendent adjusters incurred with its consent snail be sucn proportion thare-
c( as the amoun! of tho limits of liability available under th.s insurance boars to the amount paid to d sposa cf "ha cairn'
(d) Pcac-cnad'e e^pen-.ed incurred by tho Insured at the CAnpny's regu^st. Includ.ng actual toss c! .va:»s cr salarv (ft n^t
loss of other mpome} not to exceed S5G per cay oocause cf his attondancg at ho3ri.n-s pr tr ala at Such revues?
(0) P-orr.iums on aocnal bonds and premiums on, cends to releaso attachments in any suits for an amount nC' m excess of 1-p
applicable limit of habifily ol'lhis policy, but the Company shall have no obtlganon to apply tor or furmsfi'any such bonds'"
3. Discovery Clause: If, during the policy period, the Insured Shall become aware of any occurrence that may Sudseguen'l •a '\
to a claim against him by reason of any act, error or omission and shall DURING THE POLICY PERIOD oivo -/rut' ^ [ ' ^
this Company of such occurrence, any claim that mav subsequently bo made against the in«ured"irisina"out -f 'haTac* ^rrcr
or omission snail be deemed for the purposes cf this insurance to have been mado dur.n- \~g -o:.c" "er-od
4. Policy Period: T^o term "Pclicy Period" means !rg period from the Inception data to Vhe expiration date shpwn In Ihg Oec'ara-
tiers, or its ear'ier termination date, if any.
i lie Excisions
THIS POLICY DOES NOT APPLY:
(a) to the liability of
(1) any employer; ol the Named Insured for any dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious act or om.ssion. or
(2) any other Insured for his alternative dishonesty, fraudulent, criminal or malicious ict cr omission;
(b) to libel, slander, assault or battery;
(c) to claims based upon or arising out of any opinion ot title, except that this exclusion shall not appiy if a spnpdic premium
charge is indicated on the Declarations page hereci and said opinion is based upon an abstract ot ht:e furnished or rendered
by the employee(s) or partner(s) named therein;
(d) to any loss or claim based upon or arising out of the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act ol 1934 or any
amendments thereof or additions thereto;
(e) to the ownership, maintenance, use or repair of any property, or the conduct of any husmess enterprise other than abstract
ing or title insurance agency services that is wholly or partly owned, operated or manaqcd by the Insured either individually
or as executor, administrator, trustee, receiver or in any other fiduciary capacity;
(t) to claims based upon or arising out ol the handling or disbursement of funds:
(g) to bodily injury to, or sickness, disease or death of any person, or to injury to or destruction of lanoidl" property including
the loss of use thereof;
(h) to any liability assumed by the Insured under .any contract or nnrn^mnpt wh.^npy •'•" Insured has nnrned t-> oartimpate in
the payment uf a toss, includmq ullor.ievs' fees, court costs and expenses oay.mie umler a title insurance policy unless such
liability would h.-ive attached to Ihe Insured even in the absence of such agreement-
(i) lo claims arising Irom defecls in title ol which the Named Insured had knowledge at tne dale ol issuance ol sucn title insur-
ance:
(l) to punitive or exemplary damages, fines or penalties, except, that if a suit snail have been nrouont acamst tne Insured on a cairn
falling within Ihe coverage hereof, seeking both compensatory and punitive or exemplary damages, lines or penames men
the Company will afford a defense to such action, without liability, however, for such punitive or exemplary carnages fines or
penalties;
(k) to and shall be null and void as to professional services rendered or which should have been rendered prior to lha effective
date hereof lor which olher insurance exists lo cover the Insured for claims or liabilities resulting mereirom.
Territory
The insurance aflorded by this policy appnes only to acts, errors or omissions that are commuted ana result ,n o;
the United Stales ot America. Us territories or possessions and Canada.
Limits of Liability
.images solely within
1. Limit of Liability: The liabilily of the Company for each claim shall not exceed tho amount stated in [he Declaration- '-r '^ a^h
claim , and suoject to that limit for each claim, the total limit of Ihe Company's njf.l,' '--.r all -laims c -i.— *"n .-c'lr" -<=" *"-
shall never exceed the amount stated in Ihe Declarations as -aggregate". The inclusion ner-m c mcr--> ;---n Cn» '-'.//-'.a or [-" ""r''"
of claims or the bringing of suits by more than one person or organization, shall not operate to increase the Irm.I oMh'e Com^'n^T,
bilily for each claim and in Ihe aggregate •he Company s lia-
2. Deductible: The deductible amount stated in Ihe Declarations shall be applicable lo each claim and shall include loss ovmen^
but not claims expenses and fees and expenses ol independent ad,ustors incurred by the Company It is aoreed that i-*>'']amnrt irU' <
upon demand by Ihe Company, shall make payment within ten days of such part of a loss payment as v. mi en deman- maJ h. ^-°'
The total payment requested from the Insured ,n respect of eacn claim shall not exceed the deduct,b'e amo-nt -"' "
lions. '.own in the Declara-
Claims
AT," co'pA" "A°P:™IAAa cond",on p,eccdon''° ,he,r ',gh''°lhe " — * «<* '«•
(a) of any claim made against them. or.
(b) of the receipt ol notice Irom any person ol an intention to hold the Insured responsible for Ihe resul's of any bre,^ -
duly, or Ol nn incident or circumstance l.kely lo give rise lo a claim hereunder ami -h-Hi'.n nn ' ' "i- culllu-1. .ifi'j snail in any case upon rcrue't r •• > ••-
company such information as me Company may reasonably require. " .-.,.._ ...
In mo .avent claim is made or suit is brought against the Insured, the Insured shall IM.'.ADIAfLY 'or.vard ;o the Company every
demand, notice, summons or othet process received by him or his representatives.
The ungua'ifrcd -vord "claim" means nnv demand or |udcment 'cr money or services resulting from an act :a! cr alleged negligent act.
c"-r pr cm sriori E.:ch unmMted negligent act, error or omission snail tie treated as a -epjra>' c'a.r-i " .n ir -pre caims ansmg out
of a sing .J njg.iger! act, error or omis.siori cr a seres of reiaiod negligent acts, errors or emissions sns i oe treated as a single claim.
2. Assistance and Cooperation of the Insured: The Ircu-ed small cooperate with the Comp.-.m/ -,,-d Jp-n ''"'- C._ mp,-,,-v s recuest ••.•hall
atte-d .searings and trials and shall assist in effecting set: --merits, securing and giving evinonc^ "d'.a cm- •-?> sfendance of '.v.messes
ana n *-9 conduct of suds The insured shall not, except ••: -'is own cost, voluntarily make an.' prcmo-.t. assume nnv oo.igaticn or ircjr
any expense The 'rsu.'ed snail not, except at his own .'o^t make any payment, admit anv liapiiity. sett e any ca:ms assume any
Obligation or incur anv expense without the written conser.i of the Company.
3. Subrogation- In the event of any payment under this policy the Company shall be subrogated o ail 'he insured's rights of recov
er tnp-refor agamst anv person or organization and the Insured shall execute and deliver instrument and papers and do wnalever eise
is necessary to secure such rights The insured shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights.
The Company shall not exercise any such rights against any persons, firms or corporations included m the definition of "insured".
Notwithstanding the foreqomg, however the Company reserves the naht lo exercise any rights ot suorcoanon against an employee of
me Named insured with respect to any claim brought about or ppntnbuted to by the dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious act or
omission of any person at any time employed by the Named insured.
4. Action Against the Company: No action shall lie against the Company unless, as a cpndihcn precedent me'e'o. the Insured snail
have full/ cpmohed with all the terms of this oohev. nc until the amount of the Insured s odimnhnn m nav sna:l have been 'ully
determined dy judgment against the Insured after actual trial or oy written agreement ot the msured. ihe c'v-ant and tr.e. Comnanv
''c7 person cr organization or the legal representative thereof wno has secured sucn njddment or written agreement shall thereafter
be entitled to recover under this policy to toe extent of trie insurance alforced by this pencv.
Nothing ppntamed m this policy shall give any person or organization any right to |cm me Company as a cp-de'encant m anv aC'on
against the Insured to determine the Insured s liability. Bankruptcy or insolvency of the Insured cf or me Insured s estate snail not
relieve tne Company of any of its obligations hereunder.
5. False or Fraudulent Claims: If the Insured shall proffer any claim knowing same to be false or fraudulent, as regarcs amount or
otherwise, this insurance shall become void and all claims hereunder shall be forfeited.
Other Conditions
1. Application: By acceptance of this policy Ihe Insured agrees that the statements in the nooi.cation are his representations, that
this policy is issued in reliance upon the truth of such representations and that this policy embodies a.i agreements existing between
himself and the Company, or any of its agents, relating to this insurance.
2. Other Insurance: This policy is in excess of Ihe amount of the applicable deductible of this policy and. additionally, the amount
of any other valid and collectible insurance avarlacle to Ihe Insured.
3. Terms ol Contract Conformed to Statute: The terms of this Contract that are m contnet '.*,,th the statutes cf the state wherein
this Contract is issued are hereby amended to conform to such statutes.
4. Changes: Notice to any agent or knowledge possessed by any agent or by any other person shall not effect a waiver or a change
in any part of this Contract nor shall the terms ol this Contract be waived or changed, except by endorsement issued to form a part
ol this policy.
5. Assignment: Assignment of interest under this policy shall not bind the Company until its consent is endorsed hereon. In the
event cf the death or incompetency of the Insured, this policy snail cover the Insured's legal representatives as an Insured as respects
any liabilily previously incurred and covered by this policy.
G. Cancellations: This policy may be cancelled by the Named Insured by surrender thereof to the Company or by mailing to the
aforementioned written notice stating when thereafter such cancellation shall be ellective. II cancelled by the Insured, the Company
shall retain the customary short rate proportion of trie premium.
This policy may be cancelled by Ihe Company by mailing to the Named Insured written notice stating when, not less than forty-five
days thereafter, such cancollaiion shall be ellective. The mailing of nonce as aforementioned shall be suflicicnt notice and the
ellective date of cancellation stated in Ihe nonce shall become the end ol the policy period. Delivery of such written notice by the
Named Insured or the Company shall be eguivalent lo mailing. If cancelled by the Company earned premium shall be computed pro rata.
Premium adjustment m3y be made at the time cancellation is effected or as soon as practicable therealter. The check of Ihe Comoany
or any of ils representatives, mailed or delivered, shall be sull.cient tender ol any refund due Iho Insured, but payment or tender ol
unearned premium is not a condition of cancellation.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF" the Company has caused this policy m bo signed by ils President and Cecreiary, put tnis-polidy shall net be
,valid u'dless countersigned on the Declarations page by a duly authorized representative of me Company.
Secretary
Nuclear Enerqy Liability
This endorsement modifies the provisions of this policy.
It is agreed that:
1. This policy does not apply:
A. Under any Liability Coverage, to bodily or properly damage
(1) with respect to which an Insured under this policy is also an insured under a nuclear energy liability policy issued bv Nu
clear Eneray Liability Insurance Association, Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters or Nuclear Insurance Associa
tion of Canada, or would be an Insured under any such policv but for its termination uoon exnausnon of us limit of liability;
or
(2) resulling from the hazardous properties of nuclear material and with respect :c wmen la) any person pr orcamzation is '0-
guired to maintain financial prgieetion pursuant to tho Atomic Energy Act of 195-1 or anv law amenoatorv thereat, or (Oi the
Insured is, or had this policy not been issued would be. entitled to indemnity from tne United Stales of America, or any agen
cy therocf. under any amendment entered into by the United States of America, or any agency thereof, with any person or
organization.
B. Under any Medical Payments Coverage, or under any Supplementary Payments provision relating to first aid. to expenses in
curred with respect to bodily injury resulting from hazardous properties ol nuclear material ana arising out of the operation ol
a nuclear facility by any person or organization.
C. Under any Liability Coverage, to bodily injury or property damage resulting from the hazardous properties of nuclear material, if
(1) the nuclear material (a) is at any nuclear facility owned by, or operated by or on behail of. an Insured or (b) has been dis
charged or dispersed therefrom:
(2) the nuclear material is contained in spent fuel or waste at any time possessed, handled, used, processed, stored, transported
or disposed of by or on behalf of an Insured; or
(3) the bodily injury or property damage arises out of the furnishing by an Insured of services, materials, parls or eguipment
in connection with tho planning, construction, maintenance, operation or use of any nuclear facility, but if such facility is lo
cated within the United Slates of America, its terr tones or possessions or Canada, this exclusion (3) appliesonly to prop
erty damage lo such nuclear facility and any property thereat.
2. As used in this endorsement:
"hazardous properties" include radioactive, toxic or explosive properties;
"nuclear material" means source material, special nuclear material or by-product material;
"source material", "special nuclear material", and "by-product material" have the meanings given thorn m the Atomic Energy Act ol
1954 or in any law amendatory thereof;
"spent fuel" moans any luel element or fuel component, solid or liguid. which h3S been used or exposed to radiation in a nuclear
reactor;
"waste" means any waste materials (1) containing by-product material and (2) resulting from the operation by any peson or organ!-"
zation of any nuclear facility included within the definition of nuclear facility under paragraph (a) or (b) thereof;
"nuclear facility1* means
(a) any nuclear reactor.
(b) any eguipmenl or device designed or used for (1) seoarating the isotopes of uranium or plutonium, (2) processing or utilizing
spent fuel, or (3) handling, processing or packaging waste.
(c) any eguipment or device used for the processing, fabricating or alloying of special nuclear material if at any time the total
amount of such material in the custody of the Insured at the premises where such eguipment or device is located consists
of or contains more than 25 grams of plutcniurn or uranium 233 or any combination thereof, or more than 250 grams of uran
ium 235.
(d) any structure, basin, excavation, premises or place prepared or used for tho storage or disposal ol waste,
and includes the site on which any of the foregoing is located, all operations conducted on such site and all premises used for sucn
operalions;
"nuclear reactor" means any apparatus dosigned or used to sustain nuclear fission in a self-supporting chain reaction or to con
tain a critical mass of fissionable material;
"properly damago" includes all forms ol radioactive contamination of proporty.
;- fusion Pznaorsemen ir". &
President
(BROAD FORM)
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AM.STUACTF.fty AtJO TITLE 1NSURANCF. ACKNV
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
DF.CLARATIONS
L. Named Insured UTAH TITLE AND .ABSTRACT COMPANY ; _
2. Address of Insured; 629 East 4th.South. Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
3. Cover Koto Period; From: February 5, 1977 to J^bnyrv 5SlVn* fiIZiOfTTTTT^Landard ll imo fit address ol insured
stated obova
U. Limit of Liability:
The UnbLllLv of the Company for onch claim under this cover
note shall not exceed $ 100,000.00 ._
And, subject to that Unit for each claim, the total limit of
the Company's linblllty for all claims during the cover note
period shall not exceed.In tho aggregate.3 200,UOU .UU :—
3. Deductible: Applicable to each claim:
Tit la Abstracters $ 1,000.00
Title Insurance Agents $_lf000.QQ
(). Compnnl.cn Represented: Safco Title Insurance Company
7. Persons rendering titla opinion:
Alfred J. Newman
'rem Iurn: (a) Title Abstracters $ 754.00_
(b) Title Insurance Agent 739,00
(c) Title Opinion -• .._41t£Q-
TOTAL PRFMIUiS: $ 1,591.00
Coverage for Items (a),(b) and (c) applies only If a specUlc
pr(Milium chnrr.o is Lnd i.e/ttnd.
Except t
tills cov
are f Ir:i
review L
insurance agent or broker.
o such extant as may bo provided otherwise herein, the coverage of
or note is limited generally Lo liability for only those claims that
t made against the Insured while Lhc cover note la in force. Please
cover note carefully and discuss the coverage thereunder with yourho
Fndo rsttnents Attached:
1. Amendatory Endorsement
2. Exclusion - Breach of Under
writing Authority
All claims to be Reported directly to:
Shand, tlornhan & Co., Inc.
•10L Davis St., Evanston, 111.- 60201
(312)866-9010r>- &
(W;>> i
"3.
*%:
*
? &
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T^/r-n THE MUTUAL FK&, MARINE & INLAND
i 1^ INSURANCE COMPANY
I'M
<J
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA
Endorsement
AMENDMENT - THE COVERAGE
In conildcfitlon of iht primfum paid, U It hareby under ttood irxl igrctd Ihil Iht wcnon
tniit'id THE COVERAGE Ii hinby imrndrd lo road:
1, Coviragi: To ply on behill ol thi Iniurtd ill lum* th*[ tht Inturcd thall b«om*
Ugniiy obligited to pay « dirnig«i 11 i rnult of my clilmi m»dt igiinit thi Inwjred by
r»non ol my act, irror or omlttlon In proinilonil wrvlcei rind»rcd or which tnould
hivt litun nndmd by thi Iniurrd, hit imploY**t or by othtn for whom tht Intuitu* n
lialiii, In the conduct ol thi Inwrcd'i profiulon n;
(a) l tfllt ibttricltr, providrd • <tj-cc!f 1c premium ctiirqt ii Indicated on th«
Dtdintloni p*ji htrtol; (Thit Imuring Agrcsmtnt Include it mm of
profetllonil isrvlcn ol an ibitrjctif iuctl mtmonnda. ctrtillcitet murd m Mhj
ol ibitnctJ, not?! mrj rtfai»r>c*i 10 chilm ol tltlt ii w*ll tx mm# \eucr.t\, ti*
ind ntnnrn*nt tcirchci that in fumlthtd or compiled by ibitricitn t\ t Dam
for »n oxamlntr't Impaction.)
(b) l Ihit Iniunnci agrnt fnr thi lltlo Iniunnci compmin thown In iht
Dr-cljriUoni provldtd I ipecitic premium chugi ll Indicated on ih* Declarationi
pagn heffol;
(cl i pFfion who rmdtri oplnlom ol lillf, provided laid oplnlont irt batrd upon in
ibttfsci ol lH!i furnlihrd or nndrrrd by ihi employ'ifi) c* piftner(i) named
on iht Declirillont page hirtof ind provldtd a ipecific primium charg* it
Indlcalod on ihi Drclarnioni pigt hirtol.
NnlwHhilandlng ihw above, U Ii i condition prectdtnl lo coving? undtr ihn iwncy ihit
nil claimi In rnporlou1 in compilanct wi ihjhf prgvuloni ol teepqn CJ.AJMS 1 - Nonet ol
Clwlin or Suit,
Thli policy inpllei lo CLAIMS F IR ST MADE AGAINST THE INSURED DURING THE
f Q.LjCy„_LE HlOD, anting Irom prof en Ion il urvlcei per lor mod:
(a) during ihi pulley period, or
(b) prior lo Iho oflcctlvo dm ol ihli miunnco provided iho Iinured had no
knowledge ol any ctum or lull, or iny ict, error or omlulon ihit might reiuM m
• claim or luit n ol thi date ol lignlng iho application lor ihit iniurance and
ihnro It no pfoviuut policy or policial undtr which lhc Iniured it cnntltd lo
Indemnity lor tuch claim or luit.
All ulher Inrmi and condition! ol ihij policy remain tho timf,
Tim (iiKloMnmiini lorrm n part ul tho policy 10 which ll n attached and n offociive on tho inception dato ol ihe policy.
UncJBrwriun.g Wanagor
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PHILADELPHIA. PENNSYLVANIA
Endorsement
Njniod Inmrcd;
;A'A rl-l' 'in1 u'-':r.ic!: Ootnnnnv
Policy No.:
Endorsement No.:
Elfei-live Date: '
EXCLUSION—BREACH OF UNDERWRITING AUTHORITY
In consideration of the premium paid, it is agreed that the
insurance afforded by the policy does not apply to any
claim based upon or arising out of any act. error cr
omission for breach of-underwriting authority by the Insured
in his capacity as a title insurance agent.
All other terms and conditions remain the same.
A,/ M^ff/7^ signature ? ~^3.t'77 date
AH older Ifimi and conditions remain unchnnrjud.
hand, Morahan & Company, Inc.
Professional Liability Insurance Policy
for Specified Professions
Underwriting Manager: Shand, Morahan &Company, Inc., One American Plaza, Evanston, Illinois 60201
Insurer:
•jVfP The Mutual Fire, Marine and
^|^j Inland Insurance Company
m ta cj (A mutual insurance company, herein called the Company,
which is a non-admitted insurer, writing pursuant to the surplus
lines laws and not under the jurisdiction of the Insurance Commissioner.
Suite 1200 Three Parkway Philadelphia, FA 19103
In consideration of tho payment or Ihe premium, the undertaku g of tho Insured to pav Iho deductible) .is described h<rpin and in
the amount shown in the Declarations. In reliance upon the statements in tho application attached hereto and made a part hereof
and suoiect to the limtis ol liability shown In the Declarations, and subject io ail tho terms ol this Insurance Ihe Company aarees
'U'llh Kin Mlmnr< lnr-nm^ »^ (nIUi.i». ' -Jwith the Named Insured as follows:
Hie insured
1..The unqualified word-'InsuredA whenever used, means rot only the Named Insured but also any person who may bo a partner
oflicer, director, stockholder or employee wnile acting within the scope of his duties as such.
Lh^,,^ °' ^y "1SUred' ,h9 "°al -P^ntatlve o, any such Insured. In his capacty as
The Coverage
lLltof°invaH«;mT,0maH °n bGhfn°f ^ "^ a" SUmS thal ^ ,nsured sha" b0C0m9 le9aMV obli9a,ed to ^ ^ images as a re-have bZ rlnTr hh TT ,heH,nhS.Ured ^ reaS°n °' any aCt' errar or omission <" orofess-onal services rendered or wn.cr, -.cut*fess'on as: ' employees or by others for whom the Insured Is liable, In the conduct of the Insured a pro-
fa) a title abstracter. (This Insuring Agreement includes as a part of professional services of an abstracter such memoranda cer-
A.cates issued ,n lieu ol abstracts, notes and references to chains of title as well as name searches ,ax and assessment
searches that are furnished or compiled by abstractors as a basis for an exammer s inspection.,
^ c\^^^ ln ^ D«'-«<™ P-ded ***** P~ charge i3 ,ndi-
^;rof'^ c^^ms ?icNohce°;^rr £,rer8gB under this po,,cy mat an ciai™ b* <s^ - ~ ^ <*•
jhi^poli^applies to CLAIMS FIRST MADE AGAINST THE INSURED DURING THE POLICY PERIOD, arising from orofessiona, serves
(a) during the policy period, or
(b) prior to the effective date of this insurance provided the Insured had no knowledge of any claim or suit or any ac* error or
omission that might result in a claim or suit, as of he date of signing the appncat.on for ,h,s Insurance and h'ere s no
previous policy or policies under which the Insuied Is entitled to indemmiy for sucn cia,m or suit.
2. Defense, Settlement, Supplementary Payments:
(a) The Company shall defend any suit against the Insured seeking damages ,c which ihis insurance acpl.es «ven if any of the
anlegations of the su. are groundless, false or fraudulent and it is agreed that the Company may make such (nve ,ganon and
settlement of any claim or suit as they deem expedient. sub,ect to 2(b) ol this section, but the Company snail nafbe oohQa^ed
o pay any cfa.ni or judgment or to defend any suit after the applicable limit of the Company's liability has been tenredto
the Insured or exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements. lenaerao to
(b) The Company shall not settle any claim without the consent of the Insured. If. however. Ihe Insured shall refuse to cnn.Pn.
o any set ement recommended by the Company and shall elect to contest the claim or to conhnuc an e noc „"
rn ihT k W'!h SUCh Cl3'm' lheP ,h8 Compan*'s liabliifV f°r the claim shall no. exceed the amount or S,cm Sm
. could have been so settled plus claims expenses incurred up to the date ol such refusal. Such amounts arlr,provisions of the LIMITS OF LIABILITY section of this policy. ,s afe su0l9ct to ma
(c) The Company shall pay in addition to the applicable limits ol liability all claims expenses and fan* And
- " Pendent ad,uslers incurred w.th Ihe consent of the Company, provided however, that in the event a paymentTe^' *?T'
.amount of the limits of liabilily available under this Insurance is ,o be made to d.soose of a claim ,n9 Col v 'm '
such damns expenses and fees and expenses of independent adjusters Incurred win >ts consent shall be such preVQ "' 1°'
of as the amount of the limits of Lability available under this insurance bears to the amount paid to disp«e ofThe cla"m
(d) Reasonable expenses incurred by the Insured at the Company's request. Including actual loss of waces nr raia, ,v, .loss of other income) not to exceed S50 per day because of his attendance at hearings or trials at such "quest "^
(o) Premiums on appeal bonds and premiums on bonds to reloaso attachments In any suits for an imn.mt «„,
applicable limit of liability of this policy, but the Company shall have no obligation to apply fororfurnish anV^bo^r
3. Discovery Clau3e: If. during Ihe policy period, the Insured shall become aware of any occurrence ih,t m->v , h
to a claim against him by reason of any act, error or omission and shall DURING THE POLICY PFninn^'^^' 9'Ve r'59
this Company of such occurrence, any claim that ma/ subsequently be made against the Insured irsmn^! W,T" n°"C° t0
or omission shall be deemed for the purposes of this insurance to have been made during^» Pol,cy penod ^ """
4. Policy Period: The term "Policy Period" means the period from tho Incenllnn h,.q .„ ,h , .tlons, or Us earl.er termination date, if any. inception date to the expiration date shown in tho Doclara-
no Lxdussons
THIS POLICY DOES NOT APPLY:
;jj :o the .lub.ntv of
CI nny e.mcioyre ol Ihe Named Inched lor any d shores!. '-auGul-nt, criminal cr ~~ - r;s :c" -' cm -.s:cn. or
A) any other insured for his allirmat.ve dishonesty, f.-aucj.ont criminal or malic t;s ic: ?r --• —c-
(bi to hbel. slander, assault or battery;
(c> to claims sasca upon o> aris-nq ou! ot any cpimon of title except that this exclusion Zry\ ~-i 120./ I 1 ;P"c:iic arpnujT
charge is indicated on th<- Declarations page hereof and said opimcn is based upon an acst-act ot n: e furnished or rendered
cv the empfoyeets) or partner(s) named therein;
(d) !o any loss or claim based upon or anting out of the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities =xcnanoe Act ot 1934 or any
amendments thereof or additions thereto;
(e) to the ownership, maintenance, use or repair ot any property, or the conduct ol anv busings on'nrnn«,e other 'han abstract
ing or title insurance agency services that is who;ly or partly ownrd. ooerated or managed oy :np .nsured either individually
or as executor, administrator, trustee, receiver or in any other fiduciary capacity;
(f) to claims based upon or arising out of the handling or disbursement of funds:
(g) to bodily injury to, or sickness, disease or death of any person, or to injury to or destruction cf tano-Pic oronerty, including
the loss of use thereof;
(h) to anv t'abilitv assumed hv Ihe Injured unas' anv contract or r^.-^nnpnt vvnprcnv "-<- i-nir.-^ -,-s -i-T^a •-, D.iMicinaie m
the oavment cf n io-,s mclud'nq attorneys fees court costs and ccenscs cavame unccr n ; • e T--urjr.ce 20. cv, unless -".'ion
iiaci;.(y v;cuid have attache^ to Ihe insured even in the absence of such agreement;
(1) to claims arising frcm detects in title ot wmch the Named Insured had knowledqe at ne date of -ssuance ol such title insur
ance;
(j) to punitive or exemplary damages, lines or cena.ties except, that if a suit shail have uoen n.-ouv-.t j::ains: '~e insurco on a cimm
failing within the coverage hereof, seeking both compensatory and punitive or oxen-ciary camaces, rncs or Densities, men
the Company will afford a delense to such action, 'without liability, however, lor such cumtive cr exemoiarv carnages, lines or
penalties;
(k) to and shall be null and void as lo professional services rendered or which should have been rrrvjerc-a cnor to the ellachve
date hereof for which other insurance exists to cover the Insured lor claims or uaoiiiues resuiimg :.-,c;e:rom.
Territory
The insurance afforded by this policy applies only to acts, errors or omissions that are committed ana ,-esuil in carnages solely within
the United Slates of America, its territories or possessions and Canada.
-irnits of Liability
1. Limit ol Liability: The liability ol the Company lor each claim shall not exceed Ihe amount stated m the Decorations lor "each
claim", and subject to that limit lor each claim, the total limit 0! the Company s liacmv, ';r j,: c.a 15 c.-in ;.-a cohcy pence
shall never exceed the amount stated in the Declarations as "aggregate". The inclusion rerem c! -z;? tron cr,? .nsured or :rm marina
of claims or the bringing of suits by more than one person or organization, shall not operate to increase t~e limit cf the Com canv''^ ''
bility tor each claim and ;n the aggregate. " "a"
2. Deductible: The deductible amount stated in the Declarations shall be applicable to cacn claim ang ;n.a;l include loss oavm^nt-
but not claims excenses and fees and expenses ol independent ad lusters incurred by the Co-:.!r.: It .5 no:cod that tho Namod'ln-
upon demand by the Company, shall maKe payment within ten days cf such part of a loss ca,• mant as .-.r.tten demand may h-. mi^ '
The total payment requested Irom the Insured in respect of each claim shall not exceed the doductiols amount s.ho,vn in the Declara*
Ciainis
L Nolice ol Claim or Suit: The Insured shall, as a condition precedent to their right lp the protection alforded bv ihis insurant
give to the Company 35 soon as practicable, notice ~~~~ ^ :^r'
(a) of any claim mode against them, or.
(b) of the receipt ol nolice from any person of an in'cntign to hold the Insured responsible for the results cf any breacn -(
duty, or of an incident or circumstance likely to give rise lo a c'aim hereunder, and shall in any case, upon request give ^
Company such information as the Company may reasonably require.
In the.nvent claim is made or suit is brought against the Insured, the Insured shall IMMEDIATELY forward to Hie Company every
^ demand, nolice. summons or other process received by him or his representatives.
The unqualified wor.d "claim" means any demand or judgment for money or services resulting from an actual or alleged negligent act,
error or omission. Each unrelated negligent act, error or omission shall be treated as a separate claim. T.-.r <->r more claims arising out
of a single negligent act, error or omission or a series of related negligent acts, errors or omissions shall be treated as a single claim.
ration ol the Insured:
and shall assis1 ~ ~"
and in the conduct ol suits. The Insured si
any expense. The Insured shall not, exc
obligation or incur any expense without t
it, ept at his own cosi. ma*e any pa
•"" ' 'he written consent ol the Company.
2. Assistance and Coope The Insured shall cooperate with the Company and uoon the Company's request shall
attend hearings and trials ist in effecting settlements, securing and giving evidence, obtaining the attendance ol witnesses
nr,H , hall not, except at his own cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any obligation or incur
; t, k yment, admit any liability, settle any claims, assume any
3. Subrogation: In the event of any payment under Ihis policy, the Company shall be subrogated to all the Insured's rights of recov
ery therelor against any person or organization and the Insured shall execute and deliver instruments and papers and do whatever else
is necessary to secure such rights. The Insured shall do nothing alter loss to prejudice such rights.
The Company shall not exercise any such rights against any persons, llrms or corporations included in the definition ol "Insured".
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the Company reserves the right to exercise any rights ol subroqation against an employee of
the Named Insured with respect to any claim brought about or contributed to by the dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious act or
omission of any person at any time employed by the Named Insured.
4. Action Aqainsl Ihe Company: No action shall lie against the Company unless, as a condition precedent Ihereto. the Insured snail
have fully complied with all the termr, of this policy, nor until the amount of the Insured s obhnation to nnv snail iave been fully
determined by judgment against the Insured after actual trial or by written agreement ot the Insured, ihe claimant and the Comoany.
Any person or organization or the legal representative thereot who has secured such judgment or written agreement shall thereaMer
be entitled to recover under this policy to the extent ol the insurance afforded by this policy.
Nothing contained in this policy shall give any person or organization any right to jotn the Comoany as a co-cefendant in any action
against the Insured to determine the Insured's liability. Bankruptcy or insolvency ol the Insured or ol the insured s estate shall not
relieve the Company of any of its obligations hereunder.
5. False or Fraudulent Claims: If the Insured shall prolfer any claim knowing same to be false or fraudulent, as regards amount or
otherwise, this insurance shall become void and all claims hereunder shall be forfeited.
Sit-r?*
tjons
1. Application: By acceptance ol this r,„,.„, ...„ ...„„.^„ „3.^„ ...„ „.
.k_:_ __,._.. :_ jssuc-d in reliance upon the truth ol such repiesentations and
" ' ts agents, relating to this insurance.
policy the Insured agrees that the statements in Ihe application ar
this policy is i e i that this policy embodies a"
himself and the Company, or any of i
e his representations, that
agreements existing between
2. Other Insurance: This policy is in excess of the amount of the applicable deductible of this policy and, additionally, the amount
of any olher valid and collectible insurance available to the Insured.
3. Terms of Contract Conformed to Statute: The terms of ttiis Contract that are in conllicl with the statutes ol the state wherein
this Contract is issued are hereby amended to conform to such statutes.
4. Changes: Notice to any agent or knowledge possessed by any agent or by any other person shall not eflect a waiver or a change
in any part ol this Contract nor shall the terms of this Contract be waived or changed, except by endorsement issued to form a part
Ol this policy.
5. Assignment: Assignment of interest under Ihis policy shall not bind the Company until its consent is endorsed hereon. In the
event of the death or incompetency ol the Insured. Ihis policy shall cover the Insured's legal representatives as an Insured as respects
any liability previously incurred and covered by this policy.
6. Cancellations: This policy may be cancelled by the Named Insured by surrender thereol to the Company or by mailing to the
aforementioned written notice staling when therealter such cancellation shall be ellective. II cancelled by Ihe insured, the Company
shall retain the customary short rate proportion ol the premium.
This policy may be cancelled by Iho Company by mailing to the Named Insured written notice stating when, nol less than forty-five
days Ihereafler. such cancellation shall be effective. The mailing ol notice as aforementioned shall be suflicicnt notice and the
ellective date ol cancellation stated in Ihe notice shall become (he end ol the policy period. Delivery ol such written notice by the
Named Insured or the Company shall be equivalent to mailing. II cancelled by the Company earned premium shall be computed pro rata.
Premium adjustment may be made at the time cancellation is ellected or as soon as practicable therealter. The check of the Comeny
or any ol its representatives, mailed or delivered, shall be sulticient tender ol any refund due the Insured, but payment or tender of
unearned premium is not a condition of cancellation.
IN' '.'.'IT'.'r33 WHEREOF !he Company ms caused this pc':
va'id if*, "less ccurte's^cned on the Dc-c'arat ans pace cv a ;
Secretary
!•- h e signed by its Pres'cen: :,-.::
luthonzed representative cf ;-•
icv Shall net eg
tUAVJ^OiUl U t-«3 fl^X^a OvL»3 I UWii Bii (BROAD FORM)
This endorsement modifies the provisions of this policy.
It is agreed that:
1. This policy does not apply;
A. Under any Liability Coverage, to bodily or property damage
(1) with resoect to which an Insured under this colicy is also an Insured under a nud°ar enercy iiaorl'iv pc^cy issued Dv Nu
clear Ene'cy Liability Insurance Assoc:ation. Mutual Atcmic Enercy Liability tj-^crv.nters or .'.'ucicar insurance Associa-
ticn of Canaoa, or would be an Insured under anv such coney but tor its termination uocn .^naust.cn ct i's limit of haoiiity;
or
(21 resuming ,-ro~ tne hazardous properties cf -uclear material ana .vitn resoect to :.r.ir-. ,2\ a-v cers""1 hr conization is re-
ouired to ma'ntam financial protection oursuar.t to tre Atomic Enercy Act of 1^54 c irw a ,v ar^encatorv nereol, or (o) the
Insured is or i?..l this pclicy not ceen issued would be, entii'ed to indemnity frcm fr? united states o' Ame-ica cr any acen-
cy thereof, uncer any amenament enterea into by the Umtea Slates ol America, or any aqercy l" erect. 'm:r anv person or
organization.
B. Under any Medical Payments Coverage, or under any Supplementary Payments provision re'atmg to its; aid. to exoenses in
curred with resoect to bodily injury resulting (rem hazardous properties of nuclear material ace arising cut cf the operation cl
a nuclear (acuity by any person or organization.
C. Underany Liability Coverage, to bc-dily injury orprcperiy damage resulting (rom tne hazarccus precedes cf nuc.ear material, if
(1) the nuclear material fa) is at any nuclear facility owned cy, or operated by or on cenait c!, an ins-rec cr ;c) has ceen dis
charged or dispersed therelrom:
(2) Ihe nuclear material is contained in scent fuel or waste at any time possessed, handed, jsed, processed, stcred. tran3oorted
or disposed of by or on behalf ol an Insured; cr
(3] the bodi.'y miury or property damage arises cut of the furnishing by an Insured cl services, materials, parts or eguipment
in connection with tho planning, construction, maintenance, operation or use of any nuclear facility hut ;! sucn facility is lo
cated within the United Slates of America, its '.erritor.es cr possessions or Canada, this exclusion l5) applies-cmy to prop
erty damage to such nuclear facility and any property thereat.
2. As used in this endorsement;
"hazardous properties" include radioactive, toxic or explosive properties;
"nuclear material" means source material, special nuclear material or by-product material;
"source material", "special nuclear material", and "by-product material" have the meanings given them n the Atomic Energy Ac! cf
195-1 or in any law amendatory thereof:
"spent fuel" means any fuel element cr fuel component, sand or licuid. v.nich has been used cr
reactor;
;sed to racation in a nuclear
"waste" means any waste materials (1) containing by-proauc: material and (2) resulting from ;h» ccerat.on cy any person or orcam-'
zaticn ol any nuclear facility included witnin tne definition cf nuclear facility under paragraph ka) cr ;cj thereof:
"nucAar facility" means
(a) any nuclear reactor.
(b) any equipment cr device designed or used for (1) separating the isotopes of uranium cr piutcmum, (2) processing cr utllizm-
spent fuel, or (3) handling, processing or packaging waste. *" ' y
(c) any equipment or device used for the processing, fabricating or alloying ol special nuclear material .f at any time the tot"l
amount of such material in the custody of the Insured at the premises wherg sucn equipment or device is located consis's
of or contains more than 25 grams of plutonium or uranium 233 or any combination thereof, or mere than 250 grams cl uran
ium 235, '
(d) any structure, basin, excavation, premises or place prepared or used for tho sto-age or disposal of waste
and includes the site on which any of the foregoing is located, all operations conducted on such site and all premises used for si,--1
operations;
"nuclear reactor" means any apparatus designed or used to sustain nuclear fission in a self-supporting chain reaction or to c---
tain a critical mass ol fissionable material;
"property damace" includes all forms of radioactive contamination of property.
LAW OFFICES
Gridley. Echard
i Ward
CGCE\ JTiH 3-J^n-
ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD
Attorney for Plaintiff
635 - 25th Street
Ogden, UT 84401
801-621-3317
Fax: 801-621-3340
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
AOK LANDS, INC.,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
SHAND, MORAHAN & COMPANY and
MUTUAL FIRE, MARINE & INLAND
INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant/Appellee.
DOCKETING STATEMENT
Subject:
Appellate Court No. 910477
DATE OF ENTRY OF ORDER
The appellant appeals from an Order of Judgment on the
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment entered by Judge Stanton
M. Taylor on September 10, 1991, and filed with the clerk's office
on September 11, 1991.
POST JUDGMENT MOTIONS
There have been no post judgment motions filed by either
party.
NOTICE OF APPEAL
The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal and Notice of
Posting Bond with the clerk's office on the 10th day of October,
1991.
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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Section § 78-2-2(3)(j ) of the Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended. The appeal is taken pursuant to Rules 3 and 4
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
TRIAL COURT
This appeal is from an Order granting summary judgment
to the appellee by the Second Judicial District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
i
During November and December of 1977, Utah Title and I
Abstract Company prepared a Warranty Deed, Trust Deed, and a Trust
Deed Note and other related documents on behalf of AOK Lands, Inc.
and other entities for the purpose of transferring and encumbering
real property. After the initial Deed and other documents were
prepared, an agent of Utah Title and Abstract Company, altered the
legal description attached to said documents adding a paragraph
thereto. The alteration resulted in conveying away from AOK Lands
the ownership of approximately three greens of a golf course owned
by AOK Lands. The alteration took place during the latter part
of 1977 or the early part of 1978. AOK Lands did not learn of the
alteration until approximately the summer of 1979. When the
problem could not be resolved, a lawsuit was filed in the Weber
2
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County District Court in November of 1979. After extensive
litigation and a bifurcated trial lasting for approximately five
weeks, a judgment was entered in favor of AOK Lands against Utah
Title and Abstract Company on the theory of negligence in the sum
of $400,000.00.
In approximately May of 1988, AOK Lands became aware for
the first time that an errors and omissions policy of insurance
had been issued by the defendants in favor of Utah Title and
Abstract Company covering the period from February 5, 1976 through
February 5, 1977, and renewed for a period of February 5, 1977
through February 5, 1978. Prior to May of 1988, Utah Title and
Abstract Company had denied that there was any errors and
omissions insurance policy in effect. On June 3, 1988, the
defendants were notified by letter of the claim of AOK Lands
against Utah Title and Abstract Company. The defendant insurance
companies claimed that they had not been previously notified of
the legal action brought against Utah Title and Abstract Company.
The defendant insurance companies maintained that the
policy written by them was a "claims made" policy which stated:
"This policy applies to claims first made against the insured
during the policy period, arising from professional services
performed. ..." The policy also contained a "no action" clause
which required that no action could be brought against the insurer
until "... the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall
have been fully determined by judgment against the insured ...."
3
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The defendant insurance companies refused to honor the claim made
by AOK Lands and a lawsuit was filed in this action on August 8,
1989.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
It is the contention of the appellant that the following
issues are presented by the appeal:
1. A "claims made" insurance policy constitutes a
statute of repose and is unconstitutional because it infringes
upon the rights guaranteed the people under Article 1, Section 2
of the Utah State Constitution. Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beach
Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah, 1985); Condemarin v.
University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah, 1989); and Horton v
Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah, 1989).
2. The limitation contained in the "claims made"
policy constitutes a statute of limitations or statute of repose,
and is contrary to Utah law. Section 31A-21-313(3 ) UCA 1953, as
amended provides no insurance policy may limit the time for
beginning an action on an insurance policy to a time less than
that authorized by state statute.
3. AOK Lands is a beneficiary under the insurance
policy written by the defendants for Utah Title and Abstract
Company. Consequently, as an injured party, AOK Lands must be
given the opportunity to litigate the coverage under the liability
insurance policy before its interest in the insurance could be
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terminated. A beneficiary has no way of knowing if an insurance
policy is a "claims made" policy or contains some limitation other
than that prescribed by state law; and, therefore, should not be
bound by the same. An insurance contract is a contract of
adhesion; and, consequently, courts have a special responsibility
to prevent the marketing of policies that provide unrealistic and
inadequate coverage to the public.
4. A "claims made" policy violates public policy which
requires that an adhesion contract be carefully examined to
determine whether or not it protects the public which may be
injured by the insured.
5. The appellant contends that the defendant insurance
companies were given adequate notice of the claim of AOK Lands.
The insurance policy contains a "no action" clause which provides
that no action may be brought against the insurance company until
the amount of the insured's obligation to pay has been fully
determined by judgment against the insured. Consequently, AOK
Lands was prevented by the terms of the policy from instigating
an action until after it had obtained a judgment against Utah
Title and Abstract Company. A judgment was entered against AOK
Lands in January of 1988. AOK Lands discovered the existence of
the insurance coverage in approximately April or May of 1988 and
notified the defendant companies by a letter dated June 3, 1988.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal is from an order granting the defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment. Consequently, the appellate court
must review the facts most favorable to the appellant. No
deference is given to the trial court's conclusions of law and
those conclusions are reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross and
Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah, 1989).
DETERMINATION OF CASE BY THE SUPREME COURT
The appellant believes that enforceability and/or
constitutionality of a "claims made" policy has not previously
been decided in the State of Utah. Most professional liability
policies have been converted to "claims made" policies.
Consequently, the enforceability and/or constitutionality of said
policies will have a significant impact on professional insurance
coverage in the future. The appellant believes that a "claims
made" policy constitutes a statute of repose which has been held
to be unconstitutional by the Utah Supreme Court. In addition,
the appellant contends that a "claims made" policy is prohibited
by § 31A-21-313 UCA 1953, as amended. Given the importance of the
issue raised by this appeal, the appellant requests that the
Supreme Court retain jurisdiction and not transfer this matter to
the Court of Appeals.
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DETERMINATIVE LAW
1. Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beach Aircraft Corp., 717
P.2d 670 (Utah, 1985)
2. Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348
(Utah, 1989)
3. Horton v Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah,
1989)
4. Section 31A-21-313 UCA 1953, as amended.
RELATED APPEALS
There have been no other appeals in this case.
ATTACHMENTS
1. Judgment and Order signed September 10, 1991.
2. Transcript of the Hearing of August 19, 1991.
3. Notice of Appeal.
DATED this_^/ day of October, 1991.
1ERT A. ECHA1
Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify a true and ^rrect copy of the
foregoing "Docketing Statement" was maile •. postage prepaid, this
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j^5/ day of October, 1991 to Richard L. Evans, Jr. and Jay E.
Jensen, Attorneys for Defendants, 175 South West Temple, Suite
510, Salt Lake City, UT 84101.
iecretAry a
-.<
Richard L. Evans, Jr., #1016
Jay E. Jensen, #1676
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
AOK LANDS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SHAND, MORAHAN & COMPANY, and
MUTUAL FIRE, MARINE & INLAND
•INSURANCE CO.,
Defendants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Civil No. 890903067CV
Judge Stanton M. Taylor
The motion for summary judgment of defendants Shand,
Morahan & Company ("Shand Morahan") and Mutual Fire, Marine &
Inland Insurance Co. ("Mutual Fire") came on regularly for hearing
/
before the court on August 19, 1991. Richard L\ Evans of the firm
of Christensen, Jensen & Powell appeared at^the^earing as attorney
for the defendants, and Robert A. Echard of the firm of Gridley,
Echard & Ward appeared as attorney for the plaintiff. The court,
having considered the motion and the memoranda and affidavit filed
in support thereof, having considered the memorandum and affidavits
filed in opposition to the motion, having considered the pleadings
and record in this case and the arguments of counsel, being fully
advised and having heretofore directed this order,
•i The court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that said defendants are entitled to judgment as
a matter of law on both of the grounds set forth in defendants'
i;motion: (1) that plaintiff's claim against Utah Title, the former
11 insured, was not made until after the "claims made" insurance
policies issued by or on behalf of defendants had expired and that
• said claim was therefore not covered under the policies, and (2)
that defendants were prejudiced by not having been provided with
timely notice of plaintiff's claim" against Utah Title as required
by the policies and that said claim was, for that reason also, not
i
covered by the policies.
', JIT ...IS .THEREFORE ORDERED AND. ADJUDGED that defendants'
i
•.motion for summary judgment• against plaintiff be, and the same
hereby is, granted, and all claims of plaintiff asserted against
defendants Shand Morahan and Mutual Fire as set forth in the
complaint are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
'* - DATED this. IO day of •Augfcst, 1991.
BY THE COURT:
f/ Stanton M. Taylor
'—~~ District Court Judge
/A TftftsaL
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
AOK LANDS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CASE NO. 890903067
OGDEN, UTAH
AUGUST 19, 1991
SHAND, MORAHAN & COMPANY,
and MUTUAL FIRE, MARINE &
INLAND INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.
COURT'S RULING
HONORABLE STANTON M. TAYLOR, PRESIDING
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: MR. ROBERT A. ECHARD
MR. ROB HUNT, also present
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD
635 - 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
FOR THE DEFENDANTS MR. RICHARD L. EVANS, JR.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN &
POWELL, P.C.
175 South West Temple,
Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R.
Official Court Reporter
2549 Washington Boulevard
Sixth Floor
Ogden, Utah 84401
(801) 399-8510
1
1 THE COURT: Well, interesting. I'm not
2 sure I'm prepared at this point, Mr. Echard, to say that
3 "claims-made" policies are a violation of public policy
4 and outlaw them in the State of Utah. I7d prefer to
5 leave that to the appellate courts.
6 Secondly, I don't think this is a third-party
7 beneficiary contract. A third-party beneficiary
8 contract is entered into for the benefit of the third
9 party. This is a contract of indemnity, and it seems to
10 me that Utah Mortgage entered into the contract for
11 their own benefit, not for some third party, although it
12 may very well be that they are benefited by the
13 contract. But I think third-party beneficiary is a term
14 of art that would be a little more restrictive.
15 I guess I -- I have a little concern that -- that
16 if you have a cause of action, it's kind of a derivative
17 action based upon the rights of the title company, and
18 I'm not sure that -- that the law would allow you
19 greater rights than the title company would have over
20 the policy.
21 It occurs to me even if we're talking about a --
22 a statute of limitations -- even assuming that
23 limitations apply to this type of cause of action -- it
24 seems to me that -- that the limitation period would
25 have run before this defendant was given notice.
2
1 MR. ECHARD: It's three years to bring
2 an action under the statute of limitations.
3 THE COURT: Well, I know, but see, the
4 three years would have been into the early -- early
5 '80's and this -- these folks weren't notified until
6 '88.
7 MR. ECHARD: We filed a lawsuit —
8 THE COURT: But see, we're not talking
9 about — we're talking about a limitation period
10 relating to their liability, not the liability of Utah
11 Mortgage. We're talking about two different things.
12 And it seems to me that even — even assuming
13 limitations applies, it would have — the limitation
14 period of the liability of these folks to Utah Mortgage
15 would have run, even if the four-year period applies, in
16 what, 1983 or something.
17 MR ECHARD: I don't know if that's a
18 request for response. I won't respond unless the —
19 THE COURT: No, not really. I'm kind
20 of going through the process.
21 The motion for summary judgment is granted.
22 MR. ECHARD: Thank you, Your Honor.
23 THE COURT: A tough case.
24 MR. ECHARD: I think we'll probably get
25 the Supreme Court to decide it yet.
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THE COURT: Well, I think that's nice.
(WHEREUPON, at this time there's an
off-the-record discussion, after which proceedings
resume as follows:)
THE COURT: That's not the whole basis
for my decision, and I want that as part of the record.
MR. ECHARD: Well, I would appreciate
it if you do that because I'll obviously have to address
that if I appeal it.
THE COURT: My — I make these comments
as just kind of a gratuitous aside. And my feeling is
that both the -- that both of the grounds outlined by
Counsel, the non-notification, the prejudice issue and
the other issue that was addressed by Counsel, that --
that was the basis for my decision.
These other things were just kind of in response
to some of the things that you had raised and was not
really-the whole basis for my decision.
MR. ECHARD: Okay. Thank you, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
(WHEREUPON, at this time proceedings in the
above-entitled matter concluded.)
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CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH )
ss .
COUNTY OF WEBER )
I, Laurie Shingle, do hereby certify that the
foregoing four pages of transcript constitute
a true and accurate record of the proceedings to the
best of my knowledge and ability as an Official Court
Reporter for the Second Judicial District Court of Weber
County in and for the State of Utah.
Dated at Ogden, Utah, this the J_ 0'
August, 1991.
nuuj
Laurie Shingle,
day of
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Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Civil No. 890903067 CV
•//
AOK LANDS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs .
SHAND, MORAHAN & COMPANY and
MUTUAL FIRE, MARINE & INLAND
INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant.
Judge: Stanton M. Taylor
Notice is hereby given that defendant and appellant, AOK
Lands, Inc., through counsel, Robert A. Echard, appeals to the
Utah Supreme Court the final order of the Honorable Stanton M.
Taylor entered in this matter September 10, 1991. The appeal is
taken from the entire order.
DATED this /O day of October, 1991.
ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Appeal was mailed, postage prepaid, this //) day of
October, 1991 to Richard L. Evans, Jr. and Jay E. Jensen,
Attorneys for Defendants, 175 South West Temple, Suite 510, Salt
Lake City, UT 84101.
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